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ARTICLES
IS THE BAN ON PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS BY CHARITIES ESSENTIAL TO THEIR
VITALITY AND DEMOCRACY? A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR TOBIN
Johnny Rex Buckles *
INTRODUCTION
Shut up or pay up. Such is the decree governing religious, edu-
cational, scientific, and other charitable organizations desiring to
engage in many forms of political speech. A charity which sails
into the forbidden sea of political discourse incurs a two-fold in-
come tax penalty: the forfeiture of its federal income tax exemp-
tion under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
("Code"),1 and the loss of its ability to receive donations that are
* Visiting Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law (2007-
2008); Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I thank Christopher
Dykes for his efforts in procuring titles, and the University of Houston for its financial
support of this project. I thank Professor Donald Tobin for extremely helpful comments to
a prior draft of this article. I also thank the participants in the faculty colloquium series
sponsored by each of the Washington and Lee University School of Law and the University
of Alabama School of Law, and especially Professors Bill Brewbaker and Al Brophy, for
helpful comments to a prior draft. Finally, I thank my wife for her constant support.
1. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (describing organizations exempt from federal income
tax under Code section 501(a) by virtue of meeting the requirements of section 501(c)(3)).
Section 501(c)(3) organizations include only the following:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the ac-
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deductible by donors in computing their federal taxable income.2
The penalty applies whenever a charitable organization partici-
pates in "any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office."3 Because of its severity, the two-
fold penalty effectively prohibits many charities from supporting
or opposing candidates seeking election.4
tivities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influ-
ence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribut-
ing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office.
Id.
2. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2)(D) (2000). Code section 170(a)(1) authorizes a deduc-
tion for a "charitable contribution," as defined in Code section 170(c). I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
Under section 170(c)(2), a "charitable contribution" includes a gift to a "corporation, trust,
or community chest, fund, or foundation" that satisfies certain requirements. I.R.C. §
170(c)(2). Requirements include those set forth in Code section 501(c)(3), including the pro-
hibition of engaging in electoral politics. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A)-(D).
3. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3). Excise tax penalties also apply when a charitable
organization impermissibly participates in a political campaign. See I.R.C. § 4955 (2000).
A public charity that violates the prohibition of participation in a political campaign is
subject to a special tax. See I.R.C. § 4955(a). Code section 4955 imposes this tax on a chari-
table organization's "political expenditures," defined to include amounts paid or incurred
while engaging in political activities prohibited by Code section 501(c)(3). See I.R.C. §
4955(d)(1) (stating that a political expenditure generally "means any amount paid or in-
curred by a section 501(c)(3) organization in any participation in, or intervention in (in-
cluding the publication or distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office"); I.R.C. § 4955(d)(2) (stating that po-
litical expenditures include expenses paid or incurred by an organization formed primarily
for purposes of promoting someone's candidacy for public office, or an organization a can-
didate effectively controls and that is availed of primarily for such purposes). Code section
4955 imposes a tax on both the organization and certain managers. See I.R.C. § 4955(a)(1)
(imposing an entity-level tax of 10% of the amount of the political expenditure); I.R.C. §
4955(a)(2) (2000) (imposing a tax of 2 % of the amount of the political expenditure on a
manager who knowingly agreed to make the expenditure). If the expenditure is not cor-
rected within a specified period of time, the organization and certain managers must pay
an additional tax. See I.R.C. § 4955(b)(1), (2).
If the charitable organization is a private foundation, rather than a public charity, the
taxes imposed by Code section 4955 do not apply. Instead, political campaign expenditures
are subject to the excise tax on a private foundation's "taxable expenditures." See I.R.C. §
4945(d)(2) (2000). In general, a "private foundation" is a tax-exempt charity (unaffiliated
with any other) that is neither funded with contributions or other receipts from a broad
segment of the public nor one of the traditional public charities, such as schools, hospitals
and churches, described in Code sections 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). See I.R.C. § 509(a) (2000) (de-
fining "private foundation"). This article refers to any organization described in Code sec-
tion 501(c)(3) and not classified as a private foundation under Code section 509(a) as a
public charity.
4. One may rightly question whether this two-fold penalty would impose a serious
financial hardship on certain charities, especially churches, which likely receive only mod-
erate benefits from Code sections 170 and 501(c)(3). See Michael Hatfield, Ignore the Ru-
mors-Campaigning from the Pulpit Is Okay: Thinking Past the Symbolism of Section
501(c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 125, 155-61 (2006). The penalty is
[Vol. 42:10571058
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Notwithstanding that transgressions of the ban on participa-
tion in electoral politics 5 have been reported for decades,6 often
with no apparent adverse tax consequences to offending institu-
tions,7 a charitable entity operating today cannot afford to dis-
miss the hazards of supporting or opposing candidates for public
office. Charitable institutions are facing heightened scrutiny by
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), the agency responsible for
enforcing the ban.' Headlines in leading news media reveal the
most significant for charities with income consisting of fees or investment earnings, and
for charities that receive donations from donors (such as the wealthy) whose giving de-
pends on the after-tax cost of contributions. For illustrations of this point, see infra Part
I.C.1.
5. In describing Code sections 170 and 501(c)(3) as imposing a "ban" on electioneer-
ing by charities, this article does not suggest that the law forbids charities from engaging
in electoral politics. As others have noted, charities may endorse and oppose political can-
didates if they are willing to sacrifice their tax-favored status. See, e.g., Hatfield, supra
note 4, at 126. Because so many charities-as well as their legal advisors and commenta-
tors-believe that forfeiting section 501(c)(3) status is unacceptable, however, they under-
standably view the Code as imposing a ban on participation in electoral politics by chari-
ties. See Ellis M. West, The Free Exercise Clause and the Internal Revenue Code's
Restrictions on the Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 21 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 395, 404 (1986).
6. For reports of arguably prohibited electioneering by religious organizations span-
ning many years, including political activities conducted by churches in the 1980s and
1990s, see Erik J. Ablin, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church Par-
ticipation in Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 541, 559-63
(1999); Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax
Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 220-27 (1992);
Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax
Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 391, 394-99 (2000); Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical
Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 733, 736-39 (2001).
7. See Dan Gilgoff, Turning a Blind Eye, IRS Enables Church Politicking, USA To-
DAY, Jan. 29, 2007, at 13A (reporting an IRS spokesperson's estimate that only five
churches have lost federal income tax exemption for violating the ban). Congress has ex-
pressed concern that the IRS has not enforced the ban effectively. See H.R. REP. No. 100-
391(I), at 1624 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1204, 2313-1205, (stating the
committee's concern "that there has not been sufficiently effective enforcement by the In-
ternal Revenue Service" of the ban).
8. See Bruce D. Collins, A Click Away, INSIDE COUNSEL, June 1, 2007, at 79 ("The
word is that these political activity rules are a priority at the IRS right now."); Jocelyne
Miller & Harvey Berger, Problems at the Polls: It's Nearly Election Time-Are You Ready?,
NON-PROFIT TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at 24 ("[T]he IRS continues to prioritize enforcing the
ban on political intervention."); Elizabeth Schwinn, Election Ban Unclear, Congressional
Report Says, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 8, 2007, at 35 (stating that the IRS "began
stricter enforcement of the ban" in 2004); Elizabeth Schwinn, IRS Takes a Tougher Stance,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 12, 2006, at 25 (reporting that the director of the Exempt Or-
ganizations Division of the IRS has stated that the agency "intends to be vigorous about
investigating" political campaigning by charities, and that the Exempt Organizations Di-
vision has recently added 100 full-time employees and expanded its examinations of non-
profit entities).
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seriousness with which the IRS is pursuing its enforcement man-
date,9 in part through its recent and ongoing compliance initia-
tive.1" Charitable institutions and their legal advisors need not
question whether the ban is real; it is. The question is whether
the ban is justified.
In a recent article published in the Georgetown Law Journal,
Professor Donald Tobin argues in favor of the ban on political
campaign participation by churches and other charities. 1 Profes-
sor Tobin's "greatest concern" is the argument that the ban
should be relaxed because charities serve an important function
in political campaigns, or that government should support chari-
ties as they seek to fulfill a duty to express their political voice. 2
9. See, e.g., Patricia Ward Biederman & Jason Felch, Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS
Warning, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at Al; Rob Boston, Render unto Caesar... IRS Com-
missioner Tells Tax-Exempt Churches: Thou Shalt Not Electioneer, CHURCH & ST., Apr. 1,
2006, at 4; Stephen Clark, IRS Warns Churches to Stay Neutral on Politics, L.A. TIMES,
July 18, 2006, at B3; Alan Cooperman, IRS Reviews Church's Status: 2004 Antiwar Ser-
mon Sparked Look at Tax Exemption, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2005, at A3; Editorial, Is the
IRS Policing Free Speech?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2004, at C28; Michael Janofsky, Citing
Speech, IRS Decides to Review NAACP, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A12; Michael Kran-
ish, IRS Scrutinizing Charities' Political Work, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2006, at Al (quot-
ing former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson); Gail Perry, IRS, Charities Clashing over
Possible Political Activities, ACCT. TODAY, Apr. 3, 2006, at 1, 3; Vincent J. Schodolski, Po-
litical Sermons Stir up the IRS, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 2005, at Cll; James Sterngold, Un-
wanted Allies Back Liberal Church in IRS Fight: Anti-war Sermon Led to Investigation,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2006, at Al; Stephanie Strom, IRS Finds Sharp Increase in Illegal
Political Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at A8; Editorial, Taxing an Unfriendly
Church, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at A22.
Additional evidence of the importance to which the IRS has assigned enforcement of the
ban is the agency's 2006-2007 Priority Guidance Plan. This document lists "[gluidance on
political activities by section 501(c)(3) organizations" as the IRS's first priority for exempt
organizations for the plan year ending June 30, 2007. See DEP'T OF THE TREAS-
URY/INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2006-2007 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN 9 (rev. ed. 2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006-2007pgp.pdf.
10. See Peter Panepento, IRS Investigates 350 Charities over Charges of Improper
Politicking, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June 14, 2007, at 48 (describing the investigations
launched by the IRS of alleged electioneering by charities during the 2006 election cycle);
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLI-
ANCE INITIATIVE (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final-paci-report.pdf [hereinafter
PACI FINAL REPORT] (describing the examination of numerous cases involving alleged
electioneering by charities during the 2004 election cycle).
11. See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazard.
ous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1317-19 (2007). This arti-
cle at times refers to churches and "other charities" because religious purposes are "chari-
table" under the common law of charitable trusts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 368(c), 371 (1959), and churches typically engage in both "religious" activities and those
that are otherwise "charitable," such as feeding and clothing the poor. See id., §§ 368(a),
369 (stating that the relief of poverty is a charitable purpose).
12. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1317. Professor Tobin also rebuts the allegation that
the ban is unconstitutional. See id. at 1342-49 (discussing Supreme Court cases in which
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Professor Tobin's thesis is that removing the ban "poses a threat
both to the democratic system in the United States and to the vi-
tality of' section 501(c)(3) entities.13
Professor Tobin's thesis will likely strike a positive chord with
many academics, judges, and other American citizens. Further,
several of Professor Tobin's arguments are creative, as well as
thought-provoking. I respect Professor Tobin's contribution to the
legal literature analyzing the ban on political campaigning by
charities. Indeed, his article merits extended, critical engage-
ment.
groups engaged in political activity were not entitled to a government subsidy). In this ar-
ticle, I limit my response primarily to the policy arguments advanced by Professor Tobin.
Although the constitutional issues discussed in Professor Tobin's article merit further
analysis, the policy considerations raised present ample material for this article. For
analysis of the constitutionality of the prohibition of political campaign activity by chari-
ties (in general, or specifically by religious organizations), see Ablin, supra note 6, at 566-
70; Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional
Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169, 180-98 (1985); Carroll,
supra note 6, at 254-59; Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peace-
ful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 319-37 (1990); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Re-
ligious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 29-39 (1990); Steffen N.
Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the
Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875, 887-93 (2001); West,
supra note 6, at 404-29; Joel E. Davidson, Comment, Religion in Politics and the Income
Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 397, 409-22 (1973).
For other perspectives on the ban, most of which predate Professor Tobin's analysis, see
Ablin, supra note 6; Caron & Dessingue, supra note 12; Carroll, supra note 6; Chisolm,
supra note 12; Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code
Prohibits; Why; to What End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903 (2001); Alan L. Feld, Rendering unto
Caesar or Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for Participation in
Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L. REV. 931 (2001); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes,
Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Chris Kemmitt,
RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in
the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (2006); Lee, supra note 6; Ann M. Murphy,
Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PiTT. TAX REV.
35 (2003); O'Daniel, supra note 6; Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith: Rethinking the Pro-
hibition on Political Campaign Intervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 298 (2007); Joseph
S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shall Not Politic: A Principled Approach to Section 501(c)(3)s Pro-
hibition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 504 (1999); Judy Ann Rosen-
blum, Note, Religion and Political Campaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 536 (1981).
13. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1319. To be precise, Professor Tobin states that "subsidiz-
ing 501(c)(3) organizations that are involved in political campaigns" threatens democracy
and the vitality of charitable institutions. Id. Professor Tobin thus equates the removal of
the ban with subsidizing charities that participate in political campaigns. See infra text
accompanying notes 22-35. Moreover, his argument often assumes that the ban itself is
the best approach for limiting electioneering by charities. See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 11, at
1362 ("The political campaign ban contained in section 501(c)(3) is good for 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations and good for the country.").
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This article responds to Professor Tobin's thesis. 14 Specifically,
it explains why his arguments do not establish that the ban on
political campaign participation by charitable organizations is es-
sential to protect the vitality of the charitable sector or to main-
tain a properly functioning democracy in the United States. This
article also concludes, however, that certain concerns that Profes-
sor Tobin raises are valid. Although this article disagrees with
many of Professor Tobin's arguments, it agrees that unfettered
intervention in political campaigns by charities would pose some
problems. 15 This article concludes that some electioneering by
charities is proper, and that alternatives to the ban would better
address the most compelling concerns raised by Professor Tobin.
Part I of this article discusses the limitations of the theoretical
framework in which Professor Tobin advances his case for the
ban. This framework significantly affects much of his analysis,
and therefore merits preliminary observation and comment.
Next, Parts II and III address Professor Tobin's specific argu-
ments in favor of the ban on political campaign participation by
churches and other charities, in the style of point and counter-
point. For ease of presentation, I reply to Professor Tobin's argu-
ments in the order in which he presents them, and according to
his two major sections: arguments applicable to churches specifi-
cally, and arguments applicable to charitable entities in general.
Part II responds to Professor Tobin's argument that participation
in political campaigns by churches harms churches and religion,
and impairs the democratic process. Part III responds to Profes-
sor Tobin's argument that participation in political campaigns by
charities in general threatens the positive character of charity in
this country, and is structurally unsound. Parts II and III con-
clude that Professor Tobin's arguments do not justify the ban, as
applied to churches in particular, and to charities in general. This
article, however, concludes that Professor Tobin has successfully
argued that some limitation on electioneering by charitable or-
ganizations is necessary.
14. In a recent article, I have addressed several arguments in favor of the ban, includ-
ing those not advanced by Professor Tobin. See Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The
Regulation of Political Campaign Activity by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1078-95 (2007) [hereinafter Not Even a Peep?].
15. See infra Part III.E.1; see also Not Even a Peep?, supra note 14, at 1085-89.
1062 [Vol. 42:1057
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I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION: THE PROMINENCE AND
LIMITATIONS OF THE SUBSIDY THEORY IN
PROFESSOR TOBIN'S ARGUMENT
A. Professor Tobin's Unequivocal Reliance on the Subsidy Theory
The first notable element of Professor Tobin's argument is that
it consistently relies on the subsidy theory of the charity income
tax exemption and the charitable contributions deduction. 6 He
provides the following explanation of the exemption and the de-
duction:
Because of their charitable purposes, 501(c)(3) organizations are
generally exempt from tax. In addition, the Internal Revenue Code
provides that donations to 501(c)(3) organizations are tax deductible
by the donor. Thus, 501(c)(3) organizations receive a dual tax sub-
sidy. Their income is not taxed, and donations to them are deductible
by donors. These tax benefits are considered a subsidy by society to
501(c)(3) organizations. 17
This assumption with which Professor Tobin introduces his pa-
per pervades his analysis. He understands the ban on political
campaign activity by charities as necessary "to ensure that this
subsidy is not abused or misused.""8 In the context of hypothesiz-
ing the removal of the ban, he cautions against providing "subsi-
dized campaign speech to 501(c)(3) organizations,"19 and states
that such entities would "be the only organizations to receive a
subsidy for campaign speech."2 He argues "that taxpayer-
subsidized 501(c)(3) organizations should not be permitted to in-
tervene in political campaigns" and asserts that "providing these
organizations with a subsidy to participate in political campaigns
harms both 501(c)(3) organizations and our democratic process."21
Professor Tobin frames his discussion of the ban on political
campaign participation by churches in terms of "whether reli-
16. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1317.
17. Id. at 1317 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544
(1983)) (internal citations omitted).
18. Id. at 1317.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1317-18 (stating that if Code section 501(c)(3) organizations can participate
in political campaigns, they generally "will be the only organizations involved in political
campaigns to receive a federal tax subsidy").
21. Id. at 1319.
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gious institutions should be subsidized to engage in political cam-
paigns. "22 He then asserts that "[slubsidizing the entry of
churches into politics artificially increases the power of religious
institutions . . . [and undermines] our current system of govern-
ance."23 Further, he argues that churches "do not have a constitu-
tional right to both engage in candidate elections and receive a
subsidy from the government. 24
Turning to arguments concerning all charities, Professor Tobin
avers that the common law does not "suggest that a charitable
organization should receive a financial subsidy from the govern-
ment and be allowed to invest that subsidy" in a candidate's bid
for election.25 Moreover, he reasons that when charities "engage
in partisan election activities, they are no longer independent, ob-
jective voices and a government subsidy is no longer appropri-
ate."26 Further, as he introduces his argument that engaging in
political campaigns is not "charitable," Professor Tobin observes,
"One reason for providing a subsidy to 501(c)(3) organizations...
is that they are engaged in charitable functions."27 Yet again, as
he develops his assertion that authorizing charities to participate
in political campaigns is "structurally unsound," Professor Tobin
articulates his concern in the language of "subsidy."" Even his
conclusion bears the stamp of the subsidy theory.29 Thus, from
22. Id. at 1320.
23. Id. at 1326.
24. Id. at 1330. Tobin also asserts that the ban is constitutional. See also id. at 1342-
49.
25. Id. at 1336.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1337.
28. Id. at 1339. Professor Tobin argues as follows:
The central question here is whether 501(c)(3) organizations, including reli-
gious institutions, should be provided a taxpayer subsidy to participate in
and intervene in political campaigns. If the prohibition were lifted and such a
subsidy were granted, 501(c)(3) charities would then enjoy a preferred posi-
tion over all other campaign organizations, including a candidate's campaign
organization.
Id.
29. Professor Tobin summarizes the justifications for the ban on electioneering by
charities as follows:
It protects taxpayer-subsidized 501(c)(3) organizations from being corrupted,
co-opted or coerced. It protects the public treasury by ensuring that taxpayer
subsidies are not used for political campaigns. And it protects democracy by
keeping all groups on a level playing field. The government should not put its
finger on the scale in favor of one group over another.
Id. at 1362-63.
1064 (Vol. 42:1057
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the beginning of his analysis to his summation, Professor Tobin
grounds his thesis on the assumption that federal income tax law
bestows a dual subsidy on charitable organizations.
B. Theoretical Alternatives to the Subsidy Theory
Although Professor Tobin's endorsement of the subsidy theory
pervades his article,3" he never defends it. That Professor Tobin
declines to defend the theory is hardly astonishing; the subsidy
theory is a prominent, long-standing rationale for both the char-
ity income tax exemption and the charitable contributions deduc-
tion.31 An uncritical acceptance of the subsidy theory, however, is
problematic for several reasons articulated here and in Part I.C.
30. Professor Tobin articulates two versions of the subsidy theory:
Generally, the subsidy to 501(c)(3) organizations is justified on either a chari-
table trust principle or public welfare theory. The idea is that charitable or-
ganizations are involved in promoting the public welfare and that a subsidy
from the government to 501(c)(3) organizations is thus appropriate. Some ar-
gue that the subsidy to 501(c)(3) organizations is just a recognition that they
are engaged in activities that the government would otherwise have to fund-
what I call a forgone responsibility rationale.
Id. at 1335-36 (citations omitted).
31. See Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction,
42 B.C. L. REv. 843, 873 (2001) ("[G]overnment policymakers have viewed the charitable
contribution deduction from its beginning as an incentive and a subsidy . . . ."); Chisolm,
supra note 12, at 320 ("It is nearly as settled, at least in Congress and the courts, that per-
mitting a section 501(c)(3) organization to engage in election-related activity would be
equivalent to granting a 'subsidy' of public funds for the activity."); John D. Colombo, The
Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theo-
ries for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 682 (2001)
("[T]he most widely accepted rationale for the section 170 deduction remains that the de-
duction helps subsidize the activities of charitable organizations."); cf Edward A. Zelinsky,
Are Tax "Benefits" for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for
Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 808 (2001) ("Perhaps the most common characteri-
zation of tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions is that they subsidize."). Indeed, in
upholding the constitutionality of the lobbying restriction on charitable organizations, the
Supreme Court of the United States has relied on the theory that both federal income tax
advantages enjoyed by charitable organizations are a form of governmental subsidy. See
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-51 (1983); see also Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (stating that "[elvery tax exemption consti-
tutes a subsidy"); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1983) ("[I]n en-
acting both § 170 and § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable or-
ganizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful
public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.");
H.R. REP. No. 100-391 (I), at 1625 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-
1205 (stating that the ban on electioneering and the limitations on lobbying by charitable
organizations "reflect Congressional policies that the U.S. Treasury should be neutral in
political affairs," and that substantial lobbying "should not be subsidized through the tax
benefits accorded to charitable organizations and their contributors").
1065
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The first problem with unconditionally relying on the subsidy
theory is that it is hardly the only plausible theoretical justifica-
tion for the charity income tax exemption and the charitable con-
tributions deduction.32 One theory, advanced by Professor Boris
Bittker and George Rahdert, posits that taxable income, a concept
designed to apply to profit-seeking taxpayers, is virtually impos-
sible (or at least impracticable) to determine in the case of many
nonprofit entities, including charities.33 The "receipts" of these
organizations often do not derive from selling a product or ser-
vice, and their "expenses" are not amounts paid to generate prof-
its.34 Although the theory is highly debatable,35 it at least illus-
Although the Supreme Court relied upon the subsidy theory of the charity income tax
exemption in Regan and observed it in dicta in Bob Jones, the Court's jurisprudence
hardly reflects an unqualified adoption of the theory. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York,
the Court held that the granting of property tax exemptions to religious organizations did
not violate the Establishment Clause. 397 U.S. 664, 679-80 (1970). The Walz Court ac-
knowledged that tax exemption conferred an "indirect economic benefit" on religious enti-
ties, see id. at 674, but distinguished this benefit from direct subsidies:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does
not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from de-
manding that the church support the state. No one has ever suggested that
tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of
the state or put employees "on the public payroll." There is no genuine nexus
between tax exemption and establishment of religion .... The exemption
creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state
and far less than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship be-
tween church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired
separation insulating each from the other.
Id. at 675-76.
32. For a summary of the major theories supporting the exemption of charitable or-
ganizations from federal income taxation, see Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case for the Tax-
paying Good Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity Under Federal In-
come Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243, 1284-96 (2002) [hereinafter
The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan]. See generally Rob Atkinson, Altruism in
Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert,
The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J.
299 (1976); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal In-
come Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50
FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the
Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); Henry Hansmann, The Rationale
for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54
(1981).
33. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 32, at 307-08.
34. See id. at 308-14.
35. For example, Professor Henry Hansmann observes that (i) "many nonprofits re-
ceive little or no income from donations," but rely instead on commercial operations as a
source of funds; (ii) even donations to organizations providing services to third parties can
be broadly viewed as "purchases" (that generate revenues to the nonprofit donees) of such
services on behalf of the ultimate beneficiaries; and (iii) the costs of providing those ser-
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trates that the subsidy theory is not the only way to justify the
charity income tax exemption.
More compelling is the theory of Professor William Andrews,
who has defended the charitable contributions deduction under
income tax theory and policy.36 In purported agreement with the
classic formulation of income articulated by Henry Simons, 37 Pro-
fessor Andrews posits that under an ideal income tax, each tax-
payer is taxed on his or her "aggregate personal consumption and
accumulation of real goods and services and claims thereto."38
Professor Andrews argues that if income means consumption plus
accumulation, a deduction is proper whenever a taxpayer expends
money for whatever is not personal consumption or accumula-
tion. 9 Andrews asserts that taxable personal consumption means
only the consumption of "divisible, private goods and services,"
the consumption of which "by one household precludes enjoyment
by others."40 Taxable personal consumption, therefore, does not
include a taxpayer's consumption of "collective goods whose en-
joyment is nonpreclusive," nor does it include the "nonmaterial
satisfactions" derived from a taxpayer's mere act of charitable
giving.41 In the case of contributions to non-redistributive chari-
table donees, a deduction is proper because they generally pro-
duce public goods that are not enjoyed by contributors in propor-
tion to their contributions.42 Further, in the case of contributions
to a donee that redistributes donations to the poor, consumption
vices would be deductible "business-related" expenses of the charities. See Hansmann, su-
pra note 32, at 58-62.
36. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 312 (1972) (stating that the ideal income tax must be "refined to reflect the in-
trinsic objectives of the tax," and that it is "imperative to consider carefully whether a pro-
vision can be defended by reference to intrinsic matters of tax policy before evaluating it
as if it were something else"). For critiques of Professor Andrews' theory, see Colombo, su-
pra note 31, at 679-82; Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit
Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31
STAN. L. REV. 831, 831-58 (1979); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an
Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679, 688-90 (1988).
37. Simons defines personal income as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PER-
SONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50
(1938).
38. Andrews, supra note 36, at 313.
39. Id. at 325.
40. Id. at 314-15.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 358-60.
20081 1067
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
made possible by the funds, or accumulation resulting from re-
ceipt of the funds, is shifted from the donor to the impoverished
recipients of funds donated to charity.43 The ultimate distributees
should not be taxed at the presumably higher rates of tax to
which donors are subject.4
Another alternative to the subsidy theory, which I initially ad-
vanced in a previous article, and which builds upon and expands
the work of Professor Andrews, is the "community income theory"
of the charitable contributions deduction and the charity income
tax exemption. 45 The essential elements of the community income
theory are as follows. The federal government justifiably does not
attempt to subject to income taxation numerous forms of benefits
(provided by government, business firms, charities, and even the
environment) that individual members of the community enjoy. 46
The individual income tax base properly does not include these
benefits because they are more appropriately attributed not to
individual community members, but to the community itself, and
the community is not an appropriate object of taxation.47 The
community is not taxable because government exists primarily to
promote the welfare of the community, rather than the welfare of
only selected individuals.48
The community income theory justifies the charity income tax
exemption.49 Charities exist to benefit the community (i.e., to
generate community income).5 ° Thus, functioning properly, chari-
ties are best conceptualized as agents of the community. Under
basic principles of federal income taxation, the income of an agent
that is earned for its principal is properly attributed to the prin-
cipal.51 Consequently, if the principal (the community) is not an
43. See id. at 347.
44. See id.
45. See Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contri-
butions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947 (2005) [hereinafter The Community Income Theory].
46. See id. at 967-69.
47. See id. at 970-74.
48. Id. at 973-74.
49. See id. at 977-79.
50. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("Charitable ex-
emptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit .... ");
id. at 590 n.16 ("The common-law requirement of public benefit is universally recognized
by commentators on the law of trusts."); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in
1990) ("An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more ... [ex-
empt] purposes . . . unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.").
51. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 113-18 (1930) (holding that a husband and wife
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appropriate object of taxation, the income earned by the commu-
nity's agent (a charity) is likewise not properly included in the tax
base. A similar but more tentative analysis may justify the chari-
table contributions deduction.52
The community income theory explains why so-called tax "pref-
erences" to charities are misnamed. They are essential mecha-
nisms to ensure that income is properly calculated. Rather than
imparting a governmental subsidy, the charity income tax exemp-
tion and the charitable contributions deduction may simply en-
sure that the government refrains from taxing that which is
properly not taxed-community income.
The community income theory of the charity income tax ex-
emption and the charitable contributions deduction is distinct
from, but nicely complements, Professor Evelyn Brody's theory of
exemption based upon sovereignty.53 Professor Brody argues that
charities historically have been viewed as limited co-sovereigns
with the state.54 As qualified co-sovereigns,55 charitable entities
generally have been regarded as improper objects of taxation. The
community income theory helps articulate why charitable organi-
zations have been treated as co-sovereigns with the state. Just as
government exists for the community, so do charitable entities. If
community income is not properly included in the tax base, it is
sensible to exclude from the tax base the income of those institu-
tions that represent and embody the community-government
and charities.
Because the community income theory relies heavily on the
concept of income, it is an example of what Professor Brody calls
a "base-defining" theory.56 Professor Brody has properly recog-
nized that, relative to subsidy theories of the charity tax exemp-
tion, "a sovereignty view is easier to see in a base-defining ap-
were entitled to file separate tax-returns for one-half of the community income, and that
Congress had not intended to tax the husband alone in respect to the whole community
income).
52. See The Community Income Theory, supra note 45, at 979-84.
53. Id. at 978.
54. See Brody, supra note 32, at 587-96.
55. I use the term "qualified" co-sovereigns because Professor Brody argues that the
state treats charities with suspicion, and is unwilling to recognize their co-sovereignty
consistently for tax purposes. See Brody, supra note 32, at 629.
56. See id. at 585-86.
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proach."5 7 Although the recently advanced community income
theory was not one of the base-defining theories considered by
Professor Brody when she made this observation, the theory is
compatible with the sovereignty perspective. The income of char-
ity is generally treated like the income of government-it is ex-
cluded from the tax base.
The presence of theoretical explanations for the charity income
tax exemption and the charitable contributions deduction other
than the subsidy theory should give one pause. 51 If the charity in-
come tax exemption and the charitable contributions deduction
may plausibly be understood not to impart a governmental sub-
sidy to charities, then they do not raise several of the concerns
advanced by Professor Tobin in support of the ban on electioneer-
ing.
C. Limited Force of the Subsidy Theory
Another problem with reliance on the subsidy theory to justify
the ban on political campaign activity by charities is that it ulti-
mately fails to support, and even militates against, important
elements of Professor Tobin's analysis. Two major difficulties sur-
face when Professor Tobin invokes the subsidy theory to support
his justification of the ban: first, his willingness to accept political
campaign activity by organizations receiving some subsidy un-
dermines his argument for the ban; and second, his concern with
parity actually compels a rejection of the ban.
As I have observed previously, Professor Tobin characterizes
the income tax exemption of charities and their ability to receive
tax-deductible donations as a dual subsidy. 5' His discussion of the
precise nature of just what "subsidy" charitable organizations en-
joy, however, belies the conclusion that charities, as a class,
should be forbidden from participating in political campaigns on a
partisan basis because they receive a governmental subsidy. The
57. Id. at 586.
58. A few other scholars have rejected the view that exemption is tantamount to a
subsidy for purposes of constitutional law, at least in the context of religious organiza-
tions. See, e.g., DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAxES 32-34 (1977)
(discussing the distinctions between subsidy and tax exemption); Zelinsky, supra note 31,
at 807 ("[Ilt is most convincing to think of religious tax exemption as the acknowledgment
of sectarian sovereignty (rather than the subsidization of religion) .... "); see id. at 836-41
(arguing that tax exemption for religious entities is best understood as base-defining).
59. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1317.
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difficulty surfaces when one analyzes the political campaign ac-
tivities of other tax-exempt entities, including social welfare or-
ganizations. Social welfare organizations are exempt from federal
income tax by virtue of Code section 501(c)(4), ° but they are not
entitled to receive donations, which are deductible by donors in
computing their taxable income.61 These entities may support
and oppose candidates in political campaigns without losing their
tax exemption, as long as doing so is not their primary activity.62
One would expect Professor Tobin to object to the partisan par-
ticipation in a political campaign by any entity which receives a
governmental subsidy. He apparently believes, however, that the
subsidy provided by a federal income tax exemption is not itself
sufficient to justify a ban on partisan political campaign activity
by entities receiving this subsidy. After he acknowledges that a
church can form a section 501(c)(4) entity that engages in elec-
tioneering, Professor Tobin recalls that contributions to a section
501(c)(4) entity are not deductible by donors, and surmises that
"the public fisc is therefore not subsidizing the donations to the
organization."63 Similarly, he opines that a social welfare organi-
zation "still receives a tax subsidy because in many cases income
of the organization is not taxed," but it "does not receive the addi-
tional subsidy provided to 501(c)(3) organizations" because con-
tributions to a section 501(c)(4) organization are not deductible by
donors. 64
60. Code section 501(c)(4) organizations include the following:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclu-
sively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees,
the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person
or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are de-
voted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2000). In addition, no part of the net earnings of any such organiza-
tion may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B).
61. Code section 170(c), which describes entities to which deductible 'charitable con-
tributions" may be made, does not designate organizations described in Code section
501(c)(4) as permissible donees. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2000).
62. See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. The Treasury regulations state that the
promotion of social welfare does not include political campaign activity, see Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990), but a social welfare organization may engage
in non-exempt activities (such as electoral politics) to some degree, as long as an organiza-
tion is "primarily engaged" in promoting the general welfare of the community. See id. §
1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i).
63. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1325.
64. Id. at 1325 n.44.
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Professor Tobin's explanation for why he accepts political cam-
paigning by tax-exempt social welfare organizations is notewor-
thy. I respond to most of his analysis below,65 but one of his justi-
fications relies explicitly on the subsidy theory, and therefore
merits treatment in this section of the article. The relevant por-
tion of his argument is as follows:
Because a 501(c)(4) organization is a separate organization from the
church, it cannot use a church's assets or resources to further its
cause. It must be financially independent. It therefore is conducting
its activities on par with those of the rest of society. Government is
only minimally subsidizing the activity, and there is therefore no
preference given to the 501(c)(4) organization over other similarly
situated organizations. 66
I offer two observations of Professor Tobin's analysis. First,
Professor Tobin believes that a social welfare organization should
be permitted to participate in political campaigns because it re-
ceives only the "minimal" subsidy of federal income tax exemp-
tion.67 Thus, he appears to argue that an entity which receives a
"minimal" tax subsidy should not necessarily forfeit the right to
support or oppose candidates for election (the "minimal subsidy
rationale").
Second, and related to the first observation, Professor Tobin is
willing to accept political campaign activity by a modestly subsi-
dized entity because it receives "no preference" over other "simi-
larly situated" organizations.6" Therefore, he appears to argue
that governmental tax policy should be neutral with respect to
the political campaign activity of similarly situated organizations.
In other words, government should not use the tax system to sup-
port the political campaign activity of a privileged class of entities
(the "parity rationale"). I discuss each of these rationales in turn.
1. The "Minimal Subsidy Rationale"
The minimal subsidy rationale undermines the argument for
the ban on electioneering by charities. If some "minimal" subsidy
is consistent with an entity's engaging in political campaign activ-
65. See infra Part IIF.
66. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1325 (citations omitted).
67. See id.
68. See id.
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ity, there is no obvious justification for Code section 501(c)(3)'s
outright ban. It is far from clear that the perceived subsidy pro-
vided to many section 501(c)(3) entities is in excess of the "mini-
mal" subsidy provided section 501(c)(4) entities. Consider the fol-
lowing four cases, each of which assumes, for simplicity, an
average tax on income (both corporate and individual) at the rate
of 35%. Each case also assumes that both charities and social wel-
fare organizations may participate in political campaigns on a
partisan basis.
Case 1. A section 501(c)(4) entity has gross receipts from mem-
bership dues of $95,000 and investment earnings of $5,000. It
consistently expends $50,000 directly for the promotion of social
welfare, and $30,000 to influence a public election. It invests the
remaining $20,000 at year-end in its portfolio of stocks. Assuming
that the membership dues entitle the members to receive from
the organization various benefits roughly corresponding to the
amount of the dues, both the dues and the investment earnings
would constitute gross income if incurred by a taxable entity. If
the $50,000 is analogized as trade or business expenses incurred
by a taxable business entity, it would be deductible.69 The politi-
cal campaign-related expenses would be nondeductible, as would
the investment in stock. That leaves $50,000 of otherwise taxable
income that a section 501(c)(4) entity avoids.7" Under Professor
Tobin's analysis, the subsidy provided the entity by tax exemp-
tion is presumably $50,000 multiplied by the tax rate of 35%, or
$17,500. If the subsidy is allocated to exempt function expendi-
tures, political campaign-related expenditures and investment
expenditures pro rata, the government has subsidized $5,250 of
the $30,000 of political expenditures.71
69. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000).
70. This illustration assumes that the entity avoids the tax imposed by Code section
527(f)(1) because it maintains a separate segregated fund from which it makes political
expenditures. See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1), (f)(3). For an analysis of the tax logic of section 527 as
it applies to political organizations, see Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer's Perspective on
Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 1773 (2007). But cf. Donald B. Tobin,
Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611, 641-
53 (2003) (discussing that section 527 may impart a tax subsidy). For a discussion of
whether federal election campaign law may constitutionally regulate section 527 political
organizations, see Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications
for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181 (2007);
Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1027-34 (2005).
71. Of the total outlays of $100,000, political expenditures are $30,000, or 30% of the
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Case 2. A section 501(c)(3) entity has gross receipts from mem-
bership dues of $100,000 and no other receipts. It consistently ex-
pends $70,000 for the direct performance of charitable functions,
and $30,000 to influence a public election. Assuming that the
membership dues entitle the members to receive various benefits
roughly corresponding to the amount of the dues, the dues would
constitute gross income if incurred by a taxable entity. If the
$70,000 is analogized as trade or business expenses incurred by a
taxable business entity, it would be deductible. The political cam-
paign-related expenses would be nondeductible. That leaves
$30,000 of otherwise taxable income that a section 501(c)(3) en-
tity avoids. Under Professor Tobin's analysis, the subsidy pro-
vided the entity by tax exemption is presumably $30,000 multi-
plied by the tax rate of 35%, or $10,500. If the subsidy is allocated
to exempt function expenditures and political campaign-related
expenditures pro rata, the government has subsidized $3,150 of
the $30,000 of political expenditures. 72 Thus, this charity, with
gross receipts and political campaign-related expenditures equal
to those of the entity in Case 1, receives a smaller subsidy than
the section 501(c)(4) entity.
Case 3. A section 501(c)(3) entity receives charitable contribu-
tions of $100,000 and no other funds. It consistently expends
$70,000 for the direct performance of charitable functions, and
$30,000 to influence a public election. Because Code section 102
excludes from gross income amounts received as gifts, the better
view is that section 501(c)(3) itself confers no subsidy with respect
to the charity's receipts.73 The charity, however, may well have
received a smaller amount of donations in the absence of the
charitable contributions deduction. Let us assume that donors of
sums totaling one-half of the total contributions, or $50,000,
claim the charitable contributions deduction and would be willing
to part with only $32,500 were their donations non-deductible,
total. Thirty percent of the $17,500 savings from tax exemption is $5,250.
72. Of the total outlays of $100,000, political expenditures are $30,000, or 30% of the
total. Thirty percent of the $10,500 savings from tax exemption is $3,150.
73. Although the issue is at least debatable, I agree with the analysis of Professor Mi-
chael Hatfield that receipts from charitable donations would constitute excludible gifts.
See Hatfield, supra note 4, at 155-57. Further, as Professor Hatfield notes, at least one
court has opined that donations to a charity would constitute gifts excludible from gross
income under Code section 102. See id. at 155; see also Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211
F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The IRS has expressed the same view in at least one pri-
vate letter ruling. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6812121000A (Dec. 12, 1968).
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because the effective after-tax cost of their donations in a world
with the charitable contributions deduction is only $32,500. 7' The
remaining donations derive from those who, for some reason, do
not claim the charitable contributions deduction (because, for ex-
ample, they do not itemize deductions).75 On these assumptions,
in the absence of the charitable contributions deduction, the char-
ity would receive $50,000 from non-itemizers and $32,500 from
itemizers,76 or a total of $82,500. Thus, under Professor Tobin's
view, the charity receives a $17,500 subsidy from the govern-
ment.77 If this $17,500 subsidy is allocated on a pro rata basis to
exempt function expenditures and political expenditures, the gov-
ernment has subsidized $5,250 of the latter. 78 Under these as-
sumptions, the section 501(c)(3) entity with gross receipts and po-
litical campaign-related expenditures equal to those of the entity
in Case 1 receives the same subsidy as the section 501(c)(4) en-
tity.
Case 4. The facts and assumptions are the same as in Case 3,
except that the charity consistently expends $80,000 for the direct
performance of charitable functions, and $20,000 to influence a
public election. If the $17,500 subsidy is allocated on a pro rata
basis to exempt function expenditures and political expenditures,
the government has subsidized $3,500 of the latter.79 Under these
assumptions, the section 501(c)(3) entity receives a smaller sub-
sidy than its section 501(c)(4) counterpart, attributable in part to
the charity's more modest political campaign expenditures.
These four cases expose a weakness in the "minimal subsidy
rationale." Even assuming that the tax benefits extended to a
74. Assuming the $50,000 in contributions is fully deductible, at a tax rate of 35%, the
donations save the donors $17,500 in taxes. Thus, after taxes, the donations cost donors
only $32,500.
75. "Itemized" deductions are, in general, those which are allowed in computing a tax-
payer's taxable income, other than deductions specifically treated as allowable in arriving
at "adjusted gross income." See I.R.C. § 63(d) (2000). A taxpayer elects to itemize deduc-
tions. See I.R.C. § 63(e)(1). A taxpayer who does not itemize is entitled to claim a statuto-
rily specified "standard deduction." See I.R.C. § 63(b)(1).
76. Donations of $50,000 save the itemizers $17,500 in taxes when the tax rate is
35%. The after-tax cost of the donations is therefore $32,500.
77. The charity receives $100,000 in a world with the charitable contributions deduc-
tion, and $82,500 in a world without it. The "subsidy" is therefore $17,500.
78. Of the $100,000 in total expenditures, $30,000 represents 30%. The subsidy of
$17,500, multiplied by 30%, is $5,250.
79. Of the $100,000 in total expenditures, $20,000 represents 20%. The subsidy of
$17,500, multiplied by 20%, is $3,500.
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charity are, in general, properly considered an indirect govern-
mental subsidy, any number of factors may converge to result in
the receipt of a subsidy by a section 501(c)(3) organization that is
no more than, or even less than, the subsidy received by some sec-
tion 501(c)(4) entities. The amount of the subsidy, if any, received
by the charity is a function of income tax rates, both individual
and corporate, its types of receipts and the excludability (or non-
excludability) of such receipts in its income under general federal
income tax law, the deductibility of its expenditures under gen-
eral federal income tax law, and the degree to which the charity's
donors itemize their deductions and adjust the amount of their
donations on account of their tax treatment. Thus, as between
any given section 501(c)(3) entity and a section 501(c)(4) entity,
without knowing all of these facts, one is hard-pressed to assert
universally that a section 501(c)(4)'s subsidy is "minimal" and a
section 501(c)(3)'s subsidy is not.
Of course, I readily acknowledge that many section 501(c)(4)
entities (such as those that provide no significant benefits to
members in exchange for dues and have no investments) may not
be subsidized as much as many charitable organizations. This
concession hardly undermines my point that, in any particular
case, one must consider numerous factors before determining the
amount of the subsidy-if any-received by a tax-exempt entity.
Further, and probably more importantly, one should not limit the
comparison to section 501(c)(3) entities and their section 501(c)(4)
counterparts. Both section 501(c)(5) entities (including labor un-
ions) and section 501(c)(6) entities (including trade associations
and chambers of commerce) may engage in electioneering without
forfeiting federal income tax exemption. 0 Veterans organizations,
which are exempt from federal income tax under Code section
501(c)(19) and entitled to receive donations deductible by do-
nors,8 1 apparently may do the same. 2 Similarly, fraternal lodges,
which are exempt from tax under Code section 501(c)(8) and enti-
tled to receive contributions deductible by donors,83 may make po-
80. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969).
81. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(3) (2000).
82. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-04-064 (Oct. 25, 1978).
83. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(4) (defining a "charitable contribution" to include a gift to do-
mestic fraternal orders operating under the lodge system if the gift is used exclusively, in
relevant part, "for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes").
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litical campaign expenditures. 4 Indeed, the Congressional Re-
search Service has concluded that no fewer than eighteen types of
tax-exempt organizations may engage in partisan political cam-
paign activity. 5 If it is sound policy for these tax-exempt organi-
zations to enjoy a subsidy and still engage in electioneering, there
is no compelling reason to deny this privilege to a charity receiv-
ing no greater subsidy. The ban on partisan participation in a po-
litical campaign by charities sweeps with a brush far too broad.
Moreover, apart from the point that many charities may re-
ceive no greater subsidy than that enjoyed by other tax-exempt
organizations, the ban is hardly the only option for minimizing
any subsidy imparted on charities that participate in political
campaigns. As an alternative to the ban, federal tax law could
permit charitable entities to engage in electioneering to the same
degree that they may engage in lobbying-as an insubstantial
part of their total activity. 6 Alternatively, charities could be per-
mitted to make political campaign expenditures within certain
dollar thresholds, similar to those applicable to charities electing
to have Code section 501(h) apply with respect to their lobbying
expenditures.8 7 Finally, the government could impose an excise
tax on political campaign expenditures to reduce or nullify any
perceived subsidy that federal income tax law confers on a chari-
table entity. 8
My point is simply that the ban is not necessary to ensure that
electioneering by the charitable sector is only minimally subsi-
84. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-52-037 (Oct. 4, 1988); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-42-100
(July 20, 1983).
85. See ERIKA LUNDER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 19-20 (2006),
http://www.ombwatch.org/npadv/PDF/CRSReportonTaxexemptorganizationsRestrictions.
pdf.
86. See Ablin, supra note 6, at 584 (discussing the "substantial part" test). Code sec-
tion 501(c)(3) deems organizations charitable if "no substantial part" of their activities
consists of "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). The upper limits of "insubstantial" lobbying are unknown. Some
authority suggests that "substantiality" ought not be determined merely quantitatively,
but under all of the facts and circumstances. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972).
87. In general, an organization electing to be governed by Code section 501(h) will not
attempt to influence legislation as substantial part of its activities if its lobbying expendi-
tures do not exceed ceilings calculated by reference to the organization's expenditures for
carrying out exempt purposes. See I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(1)-(2), 4911(c) (2000).
88. See Not Even a Peep?, supra note 14, at 1101-06 (discussing a proposed excise tax
regime as an alternative to the ban).
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dized. If one willingly tolerates "minimally" subsidized political
campaign intervention, then there are alternatives to the ban
that are consistent with a "minimal" subsidy. One need not
choose between an absolute ban on partisan political campaign
activity and unlimited electioneering.
2. The "Parity Rationale"
Although the preceding section identifies weaknesses of the
minimum subsidy rationale, Professor Tobin's parity rationale
suggests that the ban actually promotes a policy that offends its
supposed purpose. The parity rationale seeks to justify the ban on
the basis that governmental tax policy must be neutral with re-
spect to the political campaign activity of similarly situated or-
ganizations. Cases 1-4 illustrate that the ban disserves the parity
rationale, under the assumptions set forth therein, because the
charities in these cases receive no greater subsidy-and some-
times a smaller subsidy-than their section 501(c)(4) counter-
parts. An even larger systemic problem exists, however-one that
is also easily illustrated.
Consider Case 3, above. In this case, a charity receiving contri-
butions of $100,000 and expending $30,000 to influence a public
election receives a subsidy of $17,500 in the form of increased do-
nations facilitated by the charitable contributions deduction. If
the charity allocates the $17,500 subsidy to exempt function ex-
penses and political expenditures pro rata, the government has
subsidized only $5,250 of political campaign-related expenditures.
Under the ban, however, a charity that engages in electioneering
forfeits both its federal income tax exemption and its ability to re-
ceive tax-deductible donations-a benefit of $17,500-including
the portion of those donations not expended to influence an elec-
tion. The ban imposes a penalty that is disproportionate to the
amount of the subsidy applied to political ends. Rather than
merely leveling the playing field, the ban exacts a toll on charity
in excess of the amount necessary to prevent government subsidi-
zation of political speech.
Imposition of this effective surtax on charities contrasts with
the treatment of individuals and corporations that make political
campaign expenditures in the ordinary course of business. A tax-
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payer who makes such expenditures cannot deduct them for fed-
eral income tax purposes.8 9 The making of such expenditures,
however, does not result in a disallowance of all of the taxpayer's
other business expenses. Only the political expenditures enter the
tax base (through the disallowance of a deduction). Charities are
therefore not treated on par with taxable entities with respect to
their political campaign-related expenditures. 9°
Similarly, the government treats charities more harshly than
other tax-exempt membership organizations that receive dues
deductible by members. Consider, for example, a trade associa-
tion exempt from federal income tax as a "business league" de-
scribed in Code section 501(c)(6). 91 Let us assume that the entity
has gross receipts from membership dues of $100,000. It expends
$50,000 directly for improving the line of business in which its
members operate, and $30,000 to influence a public election. It
invests the remaining $20,000 at year-end in shares of corporate
stock. Because an entity described in section 501(c)(6) is organ-
ized to promote the common business interests of its members,92
the entity's membership dues would not be excluded from its
gross income as gifts under Code section 102 were the entity tax-
able. 93 Thus, the entity would have $100,000 in gross income po-
tentially subject to tax. Under Code section 162(e)(3), members of
the entity may not deduct the portion of their dues allocable to
the political campaign expenditures of the trade association. 94
The deduction disallowance therefore effectively subjects $30,000
of the trade association's income to tax (although it is indirectly
paid by its members). But the remainder of the trade association's
income-$70,000-is not taxed. Assuming that the trade associa-
89. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) (2000).
90. I concede that a charity which expends funds in support of (or in opposition to) a
candidate for public office is leveraging its tax exemption by invoking its own name and
employing its associated goodwill, which has grown over time in part through the use of
tax-exempt dollars. The same can be said, however, of the goodwill of a business that lends
its good name to support or oppose a candidate for public office. Goodwill increases over
time in large part through expending amounts which are deductible by taxpaying entities
(e.g., expenses for advertising, the costs of quality goods that are sold, and periodic ex-
penses for maintaining high customer satisfaction).
91. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(6).
92. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (as amended in 1990).
93. A gift must proceed from "detached and disinterested generosity" rather than from
the anticipation of receiving an economic benefit from the transfer. Comm'r v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
94. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (2000).
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tion would be entitled to a deduction of $50,000 for its exempt
function expenditures were it a taxable entity, it still receives
$20,000 of income free of tax; a benefit after taxes (assuming a
tax rate of 35%) of $7,000. In contrast, under current law, a char-
ity that acts exactly as the trade association in this example
would lose all federal income tax benefits if it participates in a po-
litical campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate for
public office.
Further, as Case 2 and Case 4 illustrate, the ban does not en-
sure parity between charities and tax-exempt entities that do not
receive transfers which are deductible by their members. In some
cases, were the ban relaxed, charities that engage in electioneer-
ing could receive less of a subsidy for their political expenditures
than would other tax-exempt entities.
Were the government genuinely concerned about parity, fed-
eral tax law would ensure that non-charitable tax-exempt entities
receive no greater subsidy for their political expenditures than do
their section 501(c)(3) counterparts, and section 501(c)(3) entities
that choose to expend funds to elect a candidate for public office
would need to compensate the government at most only for that
portion of their subsidy diverted to political ends. The ban does
neither. Instead, and contrary to the norm of equal treatment, the
ban relegates the voice of charitable entities to a most disfavored
category of political speech.
II. REPLYING TO PROFESSOR TOBIN'S SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS
APPLICABLE TO CHURCHES: POINT AND COUNTERPOINT
Professor Tobin offers several reasons that the ban is sensible
as applied to churches. First, although he concedes that the Es-
tablishment Clause apparently does not prohibit churches from
participating in political campaigns, he nonetheless invokes the
history of the clause to support the ban.95 He then offers four in-
dependent reasons that participation in political campaigns is not
in the best interest of churches: (1) government will try to co-opt
churches; (2) churches will face heightened intimidation by politi-
cians; (3) governmentally preferred religions may emerge; and (4)
95. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1321.
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the risk of church divisiveness will increase. 96 Professor Tobin
then discusses why the use of section 501(c)(4) affiliates by
churches does not subvert his analysis, and posits one major rea-
son that eliminating the ban on participation in political cam-
paigns by churches would harm the democratic process. 97 This
part discusses each of Professor Tobin's proffered points in sup-
port of the ban as applied to churches.
A. Professor Tobin's Concession
Professor Tobin begins his argument supporting the ban on
churches' participation in political campaigns by invoking the his-
tory of the Establishment Clause.98 Citing the excellent work of
Professor Carl Esbeck,99 Professor Tobin observes that theologi-
ans tended to support the clause in order to ensure that govern-
ment did not control and corrupt the church, and still others sup-
ported the clause to prevent the state from compelling individuals
to embrace a particular faith. 10 Professor Tobin opines that "the
history and literature surrounding the Establishment Clause"
support the view "that churches and religion benefit when
churches are not closely tied with a political candidate or gov-
ernment official."1 °1 He does concede, however, that the clause
"does not appear to prohibit churches from being involved in po-
litical campaigns."102
I have no qualm with Professor Tobin's synopsis of the history
of the Establishment Clause. What is troublesome is the view
that the Establishment Clause and its history somehow support
the ban on church participation in political campaigns. Professor
Tobin's concession belies that view.
As noted above, Professor Tobin concedes that the Establish-
ment Clause does not prohibit churches from participating in po-
96. Id. at 1322-24.
97. See id. at 1325-26 ("Subsidizing the entry of churches into politics artificially in-
creases the power of religious institutions in society and poses serious problems for our
current system of governance.").
98. See id. at 1321-22.
99. See id. at 1321 n.30 (citing Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Gov-
ernmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 347, 355-
56 (1984) (discussing the basis for the separation of church and state)).
100. See id. at 1321.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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litical campaigns."13 Because the Establishment Clause permits
church participation in political campaigns, Professor Tobin's as-
sertion that the history of the clause lends credence to the ban of
Code section 501(c)(3) is puzzling. Of course, the history of the
Establishment Clause illuminates its meaning. But if the history
of the Establishment Clause suggests that it was intended to si-
lence the voice of churches concerning candidates for public office,
one would expect the Supreme Court of the United States to have
construed the clause accordingly. The most plausible explanation
for the fact that the Establishment Clause permits what section
501(c)(3) forbids is that the historical concept of separation of
church and state does not require churches to be mute on a can-
didate's bid for public office.1" 4 Professor Tobin never attempts to
demonstrate that the Court has construed the clause inconsis-
tently with its history. Accordingly, it is unclear precisely how the
history of the Establishment Clause supports section 501(c)(3)'s
ban. 105
Moreover, the proper approach is to examine both the Estab-
lishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.10 6 The Establish-
ment Clause cannot be construed to prohibit what the Free Exer-
cise Clause protects. An accurate concept of separation of church
and state must account for both Religion Clauses, which are best
103. Id.
104. One judicial opinion has justified the ban as applied to religious organizations in
terms of the separation norm. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972).
105. Indeed, as Professor Gaffney has observed, a statute that literally forbade political
campaign activity by a religious organization would violate the First Amendment. See
Gaffney, supra note 12, at 30.
106. The entire structure of the constitutional text is relevant to a proper understand-
ing of the separation norm animating the Constitution. Professor Douglas Laycock insight-
fully explains this point:
The First Amendment limits the power of government, not the rights of
churches. This is explicit in the constitutional text and inherent in the consti-
tutional structure; all the provisions in the Bill of Rights protect the people
from the government, not the government from the people. State action plays
a further and unique role in the Religion Clauses: State action is the differ-
ence between government religious activity, restricted by the Establishment
Clause, and private religious activity, explicitly protected by the Free Exer-
cise Clause.
Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1671-72
(2003) (book review); see also id. at 1672 (stating that to conceive of separation of church
and state "as restricting church as much as state" is to advance a concept that is "utterly
alien to the First Amendment," notwithstanding that "there are Americans who use sepa-
ration to restrict churches").
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viewed as complementary, rather than in tension." 7 The Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses suggests that
a vision of separation of church and state that requires churches
to abstain from endorsing or opposing political candidates unduly
restricts the religious voice in political affairs.'08
The most relevant case is McDaniel v. Paty, in which an or-
dained Baptist minister convincingly won election to the office of
delegate to Tennessee's 1977 limited constitutional convention.109
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that state law forbade him
from serving as a delegate."10 The state constitution disqualified
ministers from serving as state legislators, and the state legisla-
ture applied this provision by statute to candidates for delegate to
the convention."' The Supreme Court of the United States found
this statute to violate the minister's right to free exercise of relig-
ion under the First Amendment. 1 2
In a plurality opinion," 3 Chief Justice Burger traced the his-
tory of the disqualification of ministers from legislative office
from England through thirteen American states, including seven
of the original states of the Union. 4 The Chief Justice observed
that some prominent political philosophers and statesman be-
lieved that "one way to assure disestablishment was to keep cler-
gymen out of public office.""' Of course, others, such as James
Madison, opposed clergy-disqualification statutes,116 and in time
"the selection or rejection of clergymen for public office soon came
to be viewed as something safely left to the good sense and de-
sires of the people" in most states. 1 7 Although at least some
statesmen once considered the clergy-disqualification statutes ra-
107. See Carl H. Esbeck, "Play in the Joints Between the Religion Clauses" and Other
Supreme Court Catachreses, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1331, 1332-36 (2006).
108. Cf Laycock, supra note 106, at 1678 (observing that "some people have inferred
from separation a ban on religion addressing politics," but contending that "this inference
is erroneous as an interpretation of the First Amendment").
109. 435 U.S. 618, 621 (1978) (plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 621-22.
111. Id. at 621.
112. See id. at 629.
113. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion. Id. at 620.
114. See id. at 622-25.
115. Id. at 623.
116. See id. at 623-24.
117. Id. at 625.
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tional, 8 the plurality could not escape the conclusion that Ten-
nessee had burdened the Baptist minister's free exercise of relig-
ion." 9 The state had conditioned his exercise of the right to seek
and hold public office on his surrendering the right to be a minis-
ter."'2 The plurality then squarely rejected Tennessee's claim that
its interest in preventing the establishment of religion justified
the state law:
The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on
ministers is that if elected to public office they will necessarily exer-
cise their powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or
thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one against the others,
contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its command of
neutrality. However widely that view may have been held in the
18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day,
the American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear
that clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-
establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office
than their unordained counterparts. 121
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, concluded that the Tennessee law violated both the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 2 2 Justice
Brennan reasoned that the law established a religious qualifica-
tion for office, and was therefore void under the Free Exercise
Clause entirely apart from any showing of a compelling state in-
terest.'23 Further, Justice Brennan found that the clergy-
disqualification statute "manifests patent hostility toward, not
neutrality respecting, religion."'24 He summarized his analysis as
follows:
In short, government may not as a goal promote "safe thinking" with
respect to religion and fence out from political participation those,
such as ministers, whom it regards as overinvolved in religion. Relig-
ionists no less than members of any other group enjoy the full meas-
118. See id.
119. See id. at 626.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 628-29 (internal citation omitted).
122. See id. at 629-30 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Stewart (relying exclusively
on a violation of the Free Exercise Clause) and White (relying exclusively on a violation of
equal protection) wrote separate concurring opinions. See id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (White, J., concurring). These brief concurring opinions add little to the analysis
and merit no discussion here.
123. See id. at 631-35 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 636.
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ure of protection afforded speech, association, and political activity
generally. The Establishment Clause, properly understood, is a
shield against any attempt by government to inhibit religion as it
has done here. It may not be used as a sword to justify repression of
religion or its adherents from any aspect of public life.
Paty insightfully establishes what the constitutional norm of
separation of church and state does not mean. First, separation of
church and state does not require a church-ordained minister to
abstain from partisan politics.'26 Of course, Professor Tobin never
argues that Code section 501(c)(3) forbids a minister from elec-
tioneering for himself alone, and the IRS recognizes that a pastor
who, on his own behalf, endorses a candidate for public office,
without using church resources, does not jeopardize the exemp-
tion of his church.'27 Although the ability (indeed, the constitu-
tional right) of a pastor to do so presents its own difficulties for
Professor Tobin's thesis, 128 my present point is that Paty's rejec-
tion of any concept of church-state separation under which minis-
ters must shun involvement in public elections has important im-
plications.
Under Paty, because the separation norm is consistent with the
ability of a minister both to endorse herself for public office and
then hold such office herself, the separation norm can hardly be
said to preclude a minister from endorsing someone else for pub-
lic office. The latter case poses even less risk of establishment
than the former case, for in the latter case, the endorsing pastor
does not actually hold office after the election. If a single pastor
may endorse another for public office, so may a group of pastors.
And if a group of pastors may do so, why may not the same be
done by a group of individuals whom such pastors serve-a group
of lay persons known as a church? The logic of Paty simply does
not bode well for a concept of church-state separation under
which churches must be silent in public elections.
Further, if the Paty plurality opinion is correct that we have no
reason to believe that "clergymen in public office will be less care-
125. Id. at 641 (citation omitted).
126. See id. at 621, 629 (plurality opinion).
127. See infra note 143 and accompanying text (arguing only that the church cannot
endorse a candidate); note 147 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.S. recognition that
church leaders may speak in an individual capacity).
128. See infra notes 147-48, 166-67, and 177-80 and accompanying text.
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ful of anti-establishment interests" than anyone else,' 29 we ought
not assume that a non-clergymen endorsed by one or more
churches "will be less careful of anti-establishment interests"
than anyone else. A member of the pastoral staff of a church is a
fiduciary of the highest order. Her responsibility to act in the best
interests of church members, and indeed her God, does not end
when she exits the church house. If a commitment to separation
of church and state does not require us to question the ability of
such a fiduciary to respect the separation norm while serving in
public office, it makes little sense to question the ability of others
to do so merely because one or more churches supported them.
Finally, although I am not arguing that the Religion Clauses
render section 501(c)(3)'s ban unconstitutional,13 I do believe that
many of Professor Tobin's arguments are in tension with the
separation norm rather than in harmony with it. 13 1 Professor
Tobin seeks to justify the ban on the basis that churches are in a
better position if they do not engage in electioneering. 132 It is one
thing to argue that churches are most effective if they abstain
from politics; it is quite another to justify a federal law on those
grounds. 133 At least one of the historical justifications for clergy
129. Paty, 435 U.S. at 629.
130. Nor am I conceding that prohibition of electioneering under section 501(c)(3) is
constitutional as applied to churches. The constitutional issues that Code section 501(c)(3)
raises are extremely complex, and this article need not resolve them by responding to Pro-
fessor Tobin's policy arguments.
131. As Professor Esbeck argues, a governmental decision "to leave religion alone" is
not an establishment of religion. See Esbeck, supra note 107, at 1332. To the contrary, to
leave religion alone is to reinforce the separation of church and state. Id. Section 501(c)(3)
partially negates what it does to leave religion alone-not taxing churches-by prohibiting
churches from practicing their faith in a certain manner-namely, by forbidding churches
to voice theological messages that support or oppose political candidates.
132. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1322-24.
133. The 1988 policy statement of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.) illustrates this point. The policy statement maintains that "governing bodies" of
the church "at every level should speak out on public and political issues" to articulate
their moral and ethical dimensions. "GOD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE": POLICY
STATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELIGIONS LIBERTY ADOPTED BY THE
200TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) (1988), reprinted in 8
J.L. & RELIGION 331, 383 (1990) [hereinafter "GOD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE"].
Further, the policy statement acknowledges that "speaking out on issues" will at times
imply endorsement of, or opposition to, candidates for public office. Id. Although the state-
ment opines that it is "generally unwise" to explicitly support or oppose candidates, it
firmly opposes "attempts by government to limit or deny religious participation in public
life by statute or regulation, including Internal Revenue Service regulations on the
amount or percentage of money used to influence legislation, and prohibition of church in-
tervention in political campaigns." Id.
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disqualification of the type struck down in Paty was of the same
ilk-i.e., ensuring that clergy pursued their "sacred calling[s]"
rather than the mundane affairs of politics.134 A government
committed to the separation of church and state must not forbid
church activity that legislators find inconsistent with healthy re-
ligious practices.' 35 While I agree with Professor Tobin that elec-
tioneering by churches can impair effective ministry, I disagree
that government has any legitimate interest in imposing this
view on churches. The separation norm suggests that government
generally should neither favor nor disfavor conduct that churches
believe will advance their mission, including the voicing of ap-
proval or disapproval of candidates for public office.' 36 One should
resist the urge to use federal tax law to repress one form of reli-
gious expression in order to promote a vision of healthy religion.
As Justice Brennan stated in Paty, the Establishment Clause
"may not be used as a sword to justify repression of religion or its
adherents from any aspect of public life."' 37 Were the ban imposed
in order to prevent religion from speaking in a way that govern-
ment believes is unhealthy for religious life, that governmental
policy would offend the very separation of church and state that
the Religion Clauses maintain.13
134. See Paty, 435 U.S. at 622 (describing the rationales for a similar practice in Eng-
land).
135. See Totten, supra note 12, at 307 ("The question of what hinders or advances the
mission of a church, synagogue, or mosque is not a question that the government can or
should answer.").
136. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIG-
ION IN POLITICS 70 (2000) (stating that "the effort to use law to rein in the speech of clergy
runs contrary to the origin and core meaning of the separation of church and state").
137. See Paty, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring). I acknowledge that the whole
point of the ban is to repress religious, educational, and charitable entities, including
churches, from participating in a significant "aspect of public life"--supporting and oppos-
ing candidates for public office. But this does not mean that the purpose of the ban is to
repress religion qua religion; one can articulate justifications for the ban on religiously
neutral grounds. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. The ban is usually justi-
fied as a means of ensuring that government does not "subsidize" electioneering by section
501(c)(3) entities. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Although this justifica-
tion is problematic, see supra Parts I.B and C and infra Part III.E.1, at least it is a relig-
iously neutral rationale.
138. This conclusion is especially compelling when one views tax exemption not as a
subsidy, but as a recognition of the autonomy of churches. The generation of the nation's
founders may very well have viewed the tax exemption of churches in this manner. See
Zelinsky, supra note 31, at 839-40. In other words, exempting churches from taxation is
one manifestation of the separation of church and state. If so, taxing churches only when
their proclamation ministries address certain topics (e.g., electoral politics) egregiously
offends the separation norm.
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B. The Co-Option Argument
Professor Tobin argues that "there is serious risk that the
churches involved in politics will be co-opted and destroyed."
139
He reasons that a church that has endorsed a candidate is there-
after less inclined to (1) "speak out against that candidate" and
(2) "preach on issues that might discourage members from voting
for that particular candidate" because the prior endorsement
"may put pressure on the church to change or deemphasize" ele-
ments of its doctrine. 14o Point (1) is of minor import (even if true,
which I doubt) because a church cannot "speak out against" any
candidate under the current ban. Thus, even if a church is not
likely to "speak out against" a previously endorsed candidate, it is
no more likely to do so under current law.
Point (2) is more troublesome. Professor Tobin illustrates his
argument by presenting a hypothetical church that is theologi-
cally opposed to euthanasia and the death penalty, but assigns
more significance to the evils of euthanasia."' The church en-
dorses a pro-death penalty candidate who is anti-euthanasia.'
Professor Tobin asserts that under current law, "the church could
not endorse any candidate and would feel free to speak out on
both issues," thereby maintaining "a moral voice on issues impor-
tant to the church."14' Without the ban, he alleges, the church
"may lose its independence" because of loyalty to the candidate
and "feel constrained to speak out only on those issues that help
the candidate."144
With all due respect to Professor Tobin's speculation, I believe
it is hardly clear that the ability to endorse a candidate is likely
to compromise doctrinal positions of a church. Indeed, the ban it-
self may promote doctrinal compromise. Let us assume that in
Professor Tobin's hypothetical church, its leadership, including
the pastor, overwhelmingly favors the candidate because of her
position on euthanasia; the church believes that a society that
practices euthanasia is immoral, and that the state must use all
139. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1322.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1322-23.
142. Id. at 1323.
143. Id.
144. See id.
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constitutional means to prevent the practice of euthanasia. Under
the current ban on electioneering by charities, as interpreted by
the IRS, the pastor cannot endorse the candidate from the pul-
pit.145 But the ban does not prevent the pastor from "deemphasiz-
ing" church doctrine on capital punishment in an effort to in-
crease the likelihood that church members will form a positive
view of the candidate. Indeed, the current ban may actually in-
crease the likelihood that church doctrine on capital punishment
will be "de-emphasized," for the pastor may fear that if he speaks
boldly against capital punishment, his parishioners may wrongly
infer from his sermons that he thinks that they should vote
against the pro-death penalty candidate. 146
In contrast, were the ban relaxed, the pastor could speak boldly
on all issues, including euthanasia and capital punishment, and
then explain that, on balance, he believes that the pro-death pen-
alty, anti-euthanasia candidate would be best for the moral
health of the nation. Thus, in some cases, a relaxation of the ban
may very well enhance the ability of a church to proclaim and ad-
vance church doctrine.
One should also not assume that a prior endorsement would
lead to a future reluctance to proclaim church doctrine on issues
about which the candidate and the church leadership disagree.
Were the ban relaxed, a church leader would be just as free to
criticize a candidate's position on an issue from the pulpit as he is
to support her positions on issues. If the pastor continues to be-
lieve that the candidate, on balance, is best for the job, the pastor
can simply proclaim so. He is also free to reach a contrary conclu-
145. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 1828, TAx GUIDE FOR CHURCHES
AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 8 ex. 4 (rev. 2006) http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfpl828.
pdf [hereinafter TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES].
146. Of course, the pastor could clarify his position on political candidates by address-
ing the public on his own behalf rather than on behalf of the church. See supra text ac-
companying notes 143-44. But this is a solution only for a pastor who desires to proclaim
his political views to the general public. Some pastors may prefer to express their views of
candidates only to parishioners because, for example, they are based on common theologi-
cal propositions not necessarily shared by the general public. For those pastors, the solu-
tion would be to address members privately. Although a pastor could probably clarify his
position on candidates privately, forcing him to use non-church channels to do so imposes
no small burden on his time.
Further, if the primary concern of the church as a body is that it does not want anyone
attending services to infer wrongly that the church disfavors the pro-death penalty, anti-
euthanasia candidate, the pastor's private clarification of his personal opinion of the can-
didates does not redress the problem.
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sion in light of changed circumstances. There is simply no good
reason to assume that a church leader would feel constrained by a
prior endorsement of a candidate if that candidate later changes
her positions on issues important to the church. It is completely
counterintuitive to assume that a pastor's loyalty to a candidate
would trump loyalty to God and what the pastor (rightly or
wrongly) believes to be God's will.
Further, even the IRS recognizes that the ban does not prevent
a pastor or other church leader from exercising his constitutional
right to speak in favor of or in opposition to a political candidate
in an individual capacity, rather than on behalf of a church.'47 If a
pastor strongly believes that the anti-euthanasia, pro-death pen-
alty candidate is best for the moral health of the country, he is
perfectly free to endorse that candidate on his own behalf under
current law. 48 Even if, contrary to my opinion, Professor Tobin is
correct that endorsing a candidate is likely to compromise inde-
pendence in proclaiming church doctrine, the same problem al-
ready exists under current law. A pastor who has publicly en-
dorsed the candidate would presumably face the same temptation
to compromise his messages from the pulpit.
There is yet another reason to question the co-option argument
that is perhaps the most compelling. Professor Tobin laudably
seeks to ensure that churches are free to speak boldly on issues
that are important to them. The ban, as interpreted by the IRS,
does just the opposite. Consider a church that opposes abortion,
euthanasia, and the death penalty. This church, like the Catholic
Church, is passionately pro-life in general, and particularly on
these three issues. Further, the church believes that the most im-
147. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
148. Further, the most recent guidance from the IRS indicates that a pastor may en-
dorse a candidate on his own behalf quite dramatically. Witness the following illustration
offered by the IRS:
Minister C is the minister of Church L, a section 501(c)(3) organization, and
Minister C is well known in the community. Three weeks before the election,
he attends a press conference at Candidate V's campaign headquarters and
states that Candidate V should be reelected. Minister C does not say he is
speaking on behalf of Church L. His endorsement is reported on the front
page of the local newspaper and he is identified in the article as the minister
of Church L. Because Minister C did not make the endorsement at an official
church function, in an official church publication or otherwise use the
church's assets, and did not state that he was speaking as a representative of
Church L, his actions do not constitute campaign intervention by Church L.
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portant role of government is to preserve and protect human life
in all of its phases and across the globe. Thus, the church believes
that the faithful should do everything in their power to protect
and preserve human life, including electing public officials who
will support policies promoting human life.149 Plainly, as inter-
preted by the IRS, the ban forbids (under the penalty of forfeiting
federal income tax exemption) the church from proclaiming to
members that they should vote for a named candidate because
her views are most consistent with the pro-life views of the
church, notwithstanding that this is the doctrinal message of the
church.'50 The church is most certainly not free to speak its mes-
sage under the ban. 1 '
Sadly, the ban is even more odious than this example demon-
strates. Many will be quick to respond to this illustration by as-
serting that the church is perfectly free to speak out on issues as
long as candidates are not explicitly endorsed. The reality is oth-
erwise.'52 The IRS has long interpreted the ban to foreclose not
only express advocacy, but also issue advocacy in circumstances
the IRS deems to constitute an unstated but implied endorse-
ment.'53 The IRS examines all of the facts and circumstances to
determine if a charity has expressed a bias in favor of, or against,
a candidate for office.' 54 Certain of the circumstances that the
IRS considers important are whether the charity publicly ad-
149. See Kemmitt, supra note 12, at 169 ("Churches that prioritize the preservation of
human life... may legitimately feel that their religion requires them to support the party
that opposes abortion .... ).
150. See TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES, supra note 145, at 7, 8 exs. 2 & 4.
151. Cf. CARTER, supra note 136, at 81 ("[O]nly in Wonderland would anybody seriously
imagine that we protect religious freedom when we punish churches that speak the wrong
words."); Kemmitt, supra note 12, at 169-74 (arguing that the ban burdens the free exer-
cise of religion).
152. See Totten, supra note 12, at 309 (stating that "the line between partisan inter-
vention and issue advocacy is appealing in theory .... [but] flawed in practice").
153. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (stating that charities "must
avoid any issue advocacy that functions as political campaign intervention"); Rev. Rul. 78-
248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (ruling that an organization which widely distributes information
about candidates' voting records on only one or a few issues considered important by the
charity violates the ban, even if the charity does not expressly support or oppose any can-
didate; reasoning that, although "the guide may provide the voting public with useful in-
formation," its purpose is partisan because of "its emphasis on one area of concern"). The
IRS has found no violation of the ban when an organization distributes voting records of
congressmen on a narrow range of issues, if the distribution is not widespread and is not
targeted to coincide with elections. See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
154. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 ("All the facts and circumstances need to
be considered to determine if the advocacy is political campaign intervention.").
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dresses issues that have been raised to distinguish candidates
and whether those issues are addressed close to the time of elec-
tions. 1 5 The IRS could find that the pro-life church violates the
ban if it takes a strong stand on any of these three issues, espe-
cially if it concentrates its message around election time.15 6 The
guidance from the IRS appears to render irrelevant that the
church discusses these three issues precisely because they are of
155. See id. The IRS maintains that the following are "key factors" in determining
whether a charity has violated the ban when it engages in issue advocacy:
Whether the statement identifies one or more candidates for a given public
office;
Whether the statement expresses approval or disapproval of one or more
candidates' positions and/or actions;
Whether the statement is delivered close in time to the election;
Whether the statement makes reference to voting or an election;
Whether the issue addressed in the communication has been raised as an is-
sue distinguishing candidates for a given office;
Whether the communication is part of an ongoing series of communications
by the organization on the same issue that are made independent of the tim-
ing of an election; and
Whether the timing of the communication and identification of the candidate
are related to a non-electoral event such as a scheduled vote on specific legis-
lation by an officeholder who also happens to be a candidate for public office.
Id.
156. For example, consider a pastor who sporadically comments from the pulpit that
human life begins at conception, but delivers sermons focusing on this issue primarily in
the last two months of an election cycle. In one such sermon, delivered when there is no
pending legislation related to abortion, the pastor states as follows:
You have heard the speeches of Senators X, Y, and Z, all of whom are run-
ning for President. You probably know that Senators X and Y, highly edu-
cated statesmen with multiple academic degrees, do not believe that an un-
born child is a person from the moment of conception. I am not here to tell
you how to vote. But I am here to tell you that no issue facing this country,
nay, this world, is more important than deciding whether we protect the lives
of all people made in the image of the living God, no matter how strong or
weak, or how old or young, they might be. God's Word teaches us that every-
one, even the unborn, have humanity, and therefore dignity. Do not be de-
ceived by the empty, worldly rhetoric of those whose so-called enlightenment
is nothing but darkness sanctioned by the intellectual elite. Do not believe
them for a moment. You will be bombarded in the next few weeks with a
competing message from the world. Reject it. It is evil. Instead, hold fast to
the Truth. You will not be sorry that you did.
At least six, and possibly all seven, of the factors set forth in Revenue Ruling 2007-41 sug-
gest that preaching a sermon containing this statement would constitute prohibited elec-
tioneering. It is far from clear, however, that the church has actually endorsed or opposed
a candidate. One could interpret the reference to the election, the candidates, and their
positions simply as a means of identifying the arguments to which the pastor objects theo-
logically. Characterizing these arguments as evil and urging parishioners to reject them
may be the best way the pastor knows to counter the tendency of people to accept the posi-
tions of those whom they respect (on account of educational or political achievement, for
example). Finally, the timing of the sermon could reflect a desire to impact people's analy-
sis of the issues when they are most likely to be contemplating them thoroughly.
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great doctrinal importance to the church and does so near an
election because this is when people are prone to think most seri-
ously about these issues." 7 As interpreted by the IRS, the ban
produces a grimly ironic state of affairs that contradicts a healthy
vision of a liberal, democratic society in which mediating institu-
tions participate robustly. 5 8
On balance, the ban itself presents a far greater risk of the re-
ligious community's "co-option" by government than would a re-
laxation of the ban.'59 The whole point of the ban is to prevent
section 501(c)(3) entities, including churches, from speaking out
and otherwise participating on a partisan basis in public elec-
tions. If the doctrine of a church truly encourages it to take a
stand in public elections, the church must choose between fidelity
to its doctrine and the benefits of tax exemption (and favorable
donee status under Code section 170). Assuming the ban is de-
signed to influence the behavior of churches, it must rest on the
assumption that, absent the ban, some churches would indeed
speak out in favor of, or in opposition to, candidates for public of-
fice. In the case of churches that otherwise would endorse and
oppose candidates on account of the church's theological views,
the ban is a financial inducement from the government to deviate
from a religiously motivated practice.16 ° Thus, if the ban truly
changes the behavior of churches, including the practice of taking
political stands on candidates in accordance with church dogma,
the ban itself constitutes one of the most egregious forms of gov-
157. To his credit, Professor Tobin recognizes the problems of the IRS's facts and cir-
cumstances test. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1357.
158. See Garnett, supra note 12, at 798-801.
159. Cf. Kemmitt, supra note 12, at 174 (describing the ban as "co-opting" from the
church the authority to define what is religious).
160. Professor Stephen Carter puts the matter more poignantly:
Imagine .. .a state so insecure and, at the same time, so totalitarian, so de-
termined to invest every corner of society with a single, state-imposed vision
of right and wrong, that it actually doles out benefits to those churches that
preach the right messages and denies those benefits to churches that preach
the wrong ones. So great a horror, one might think, is the stuff of the old
communist empire or one of the few remaining dictatorships in the Third
World, precisely what the Western-style tradition of constitutional rights is
designed to oppose. One would be wrong.
The nation I describe is the United States of America ....
CARTER, supra note 136, at 67; see also Lee, supra note 6, at 434 (stating that the Code
"pays churches through tax-exempt status to be silent on issues deemed by the state to be
political").
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ernmental co-option of the religious community that one can en-
visage. 161
C. The Intimidation Argument
Professor Tobin next argues that without the ban, "politicians
may pressure churches to become involved in a political cam-
paign."'62 He fears that churches would then face the dilemma of
either disappointing "powerful politicians" or "reluctantly" en-
dorsing them or their candidates. 163 The ban, he argues, "provides
churches with justification for denying campaign requests and...
helps insulate churches from political intimidation."'64 I agree
with Professor Tobin that absent the ban, candidates would ac-
tively seek the political support of section 501(c)(3) entities, in-
cluding churches. I seriously question, however, whether the ban
is necessary to "insulate churches from political intimidation."
First, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause protect churches from state action that infringes upon the
exercise of their religious liberties, including the right not to en-
ter into the political fray on doctrinal grounds. Thus, the Consti-
tution itself protects churches from the most egregious kinds of
retaliation by those candidates elected to office.
Second, the ban is hardly an impenetrable shield against politi-
cal pressure. As a practical matter, even with the ban, candidates
seek forms of assistance from churches, as Professor Tobin him-
self notes. 6 ' More importantly, the ban offers church leaders, in-
cluding pastors, no legal "excuse" for declining to endorse candi-
dates on behalf of themselves rather than on behalf of their
churches.
161. Professor Richard Garnett pens essentially the same thought: "[W]hen religion-
whether because of the didactic effects of the tax law, or for any other reason-becomes
content to be what government says it is or should be, then maybe, in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's words, it really has been 'destroyed.'" Garnett, supra note 12, at 798; see also id. at
774-75 (stating that when government enforces its own view of the proper place of relig-
ion, religious entities "may yield to the temptation to embrace, and to incorporate, this
view themselves"); id. at 796 ("[B]y telling faith where it belongs, government molds relig-
ion's own sense of what it is.").
162. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1323.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. (citing the 2004 Bush campaign's request for church rosters).
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To illustrate, let us assume that a candidate seeks an en-
dorsement from Dr. Tony Evans, nationally known as a promi-
nent Christian author and speaker and the Senior Pastor of Oak
Cliff Bible Fellowship. 166 Although I am sure the candidate would
covet an endorsement from the church itself, she will be almost as
happy-and maybe happier-with a personal endorsement from
Dr. Evans. People know Dr. Evans as the pastor of the church,
and they know the church largely because Dr. Evans is its pastor.
Should Dr. Evans decline to endorse the candidate, he must do so
on his own two feet under current law; the ban provides him with
not a scintilla of a basis for shunning the invitation to endorse the
candidate.167 Many forms of "intimidation" that could be applied
against the church in the absence of the ban, should Dr. Evans
hesitate to endorse the candidate, could also be applied under
current law. For example, if the threat is that the candidate, if
elected, would not support evangelical faith-based programs at
the church without its endorsement, the candidate could level the
same threat against Dr. Evans under current law should he de-
cline to offer his personal endorsement.
Current law also fails to buffer churches from a similar risk of
political pressure. The Code permits Section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions to engage in legislative activities, including grassroots-
lobbying, as long as attempts to influence legislation comprise "no
substantial part" of the entity's operations."16 Thus, a church that
seldom attempts to influence legislation has no good legal excuse
for failing to endorse pet legislative projects of powerful politi-
cians-including those already in office. For example, a church
asked to publicly support a partial-birth abortion bill sponsored
by a powerful United States Senator and endorsed by the current
Presidential administration could experience just as much politi-
cal pressure to support the bill as the church urged to support the
same Senator in her bid for re-election. If the law permits
churches to engage in modest lobbying notwithstanding this
prospect for political pressure, then why must the law categori-
cally forbid churches from endorsing candidates for public office?
166. See Oak Cliff Bible Fellowship, Our Pastor, http://www.ocbfchurch.org/index.cfm/
pageid/660/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
167. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
168. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
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Further, if a church body truly prefers to abstain from partisan
politics for religious reasons (as well it might), the church does
not need section 501(c)(3)'s ban to bootstrap its convictions. Prior
to an election year, a church body can simply adopt a policy by
vote of members in a congregational church or by vote or procla-
mation of elders or other leaders in a hierarchical ecclesial struc-
ture clearly stating its non-partisan stance. If the church desires
longevity of the policy, it can adopt the policy as part of its arti-
cles of incorporation or other governing instrument. 169 A church
leader who is then approached by a candidate seeking endorse-
ment on behalf of the church can invoke the policy to avoid any
implication that the church is shunning that particular candi-
date. Although the candidate obviously could pressure the leader
to attempt to change the policy, any such measure would take
time (especially if it is adopted as part of the church's governing
instrument filed with the office of the Secretary of State), would
likely have a slim chance of success, and would reflect poorly on
the candidate once her pressure tactics became public.
In sum, the ban is not as effective as Professor Tobin contem-
plates in insulating churches from political intimidation. More-
over, although lifting the ban may moderately increase the pres-
sure on church leaders to endorse candidates, existing
constitutional safeguards and self-help measures can minimize
the adverse consequences of relaxing the ban.
D. The Preference Argument
Professor Tobin next argues that, in the absence of the ban,
"there is a serious risk that some religions will find government
favor, while others will receive government scorn."' 7 ° He contem-
plates an "incentive system" rewarding churches that support the
winning candidate,17' and political "retribution" directed towards
religions or religious leaders who have not supported incum-
bents.'72 The retributive parade includes the failure to receive
government grants, exclusion from government discussions in-
volving religion, and unofficial blacklisting by government offi-
169. For several complementary self-help measures an apolitical church could adopt,
see infra Part IIF.
170. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1323.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1324.
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cials. 17 Professor Tobin predicts a resulting impact on religious
diversity and a diminution in respect for religion. 
174
This argument is essentially an extension of the intimidation
argument, for it details the supposed reasons that candidates
would intimidate churches in the first place. The assertion is that
churches realize that if they do not support a winning candidate,
they may be punished; on the other hand, they may receive pref-
erential treatment if they have supported the victor.
My responses to the intimidation argument largely apply to the
preference argument as well, and can be summarized into four
points: (1) the Constitution protects churches from many forms of
retaliation by those candidates who are elected to office and pro-
hibits government from favoring one religion over another; (2) the
ban offers religious leaders no legal "excuse" for declining to en-
dorse candidates on behalf of themselves rather than on behalf of
their churches; (3) current law offers only minimal protection
against retaliation for failing to support the pet legislative pro-
jects of incumbents; and (4) self-help measures can alleviate some
of the political pressure contemplated by Professor Tobin.
Although I need not reapply these arguments to the preference
argument in detail, elaboration of points (1) and (2) is useful.
Consider the first form of governmental action contemplated by
Professor Tobin-the making or withholding of government
grants. 175 Assume the executive branch funds a government ini-
tiative to support faith-based programs to rehabilitate drug ad-
dicts. The government declines to fund a grant proposal offered
by a church's subsidiary for its drug rehabilitation program, and
it just so happens that the church and its subsidiary publicly
criticized the administration in the most recent election, strictly
for theological reasons consistent with church doctrine. If the
church and its subsidiary can prove that the government's deci-
sion was an attempt to punish the church for expressing its reli-
gious viewpoint, the entities would likely have a First Amend-
ment claim against the government.'76 The problem is one of
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1323.
175. See id. at 1324.
176. The Establishment Clause requires government to maintain neutrality not only
between religion and non-religion, but also between one religion and another. See, e.g.,
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73, 679-80 (1970) (upholding prop-
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proof, not the ability of churches to support or oppose candidates
for public office.
Further, because the same problem exists even with the ban,
this justification for the ban collapses. As discussed above, the
ban does not prevent church-affiliated ministers from endorsing
or opposing political candidates on their own behalf. Therefore,
the ban does not even remotely prevent an incumbent from re-
taliating against non-endorsing religious leaders or their affili-
ated institutions.
Similarly, the ban does nothing to ensure that churches affili-
ated with religious leaders who have personally endorsed an in-
cumbent will not receive preferential treatment. Ironically, the
very sources cited by Professor Tobin support my point.177 For ex-
ample, an article discussing grants made under President Bush's
faith-based initiative states the following: "Among other new
beneficiaries of federal funding during the Bush years are groups
run by Christian conservatives, including those in the African
American and Hispanic communities. Many of the leaders have
been active Republicans and influential supporters of Bush's
presidential campaigns."178 Whether or not one concludes that
President Bush has rewarded his political allies, the ban plainly
does not prohibit religious leaders from being politically "active"
or "influential supporters" of a candidate. 1
79
The argument that the potential for abuse would be even
greater without the ban is not compelling. First, it is impossible
to quantify the risk of greater abuse without the ban. Second,
erty tax exemption for property owned by religious organizations and other non-profit in-
stitutions; stating that the state "has not singled out one particular church or religious
group or even churches as such"); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947) (up-
holding public reimbursement of funds expended by parents to bus their children to
Catholic parochial schools; stating that the Establishment Clause means that neither a
state nor the federal government can enact laws that "aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another"). The denial of funding to the applicant because of its re-
ligious views could also violate its First Amendment right to free speech. See Rosenberger
v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995) (holding that a state university's denial
of funding to a student journal expressing religious viewpoints violated the students' right
to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment).
177. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Grants Flow to Bush Allies on Social Issues, WASH.
POST, Mar. 22, 2006, at Al, cited in Tobin, supra note 11, at 1324 n.41 (discussing the
Bush administration's grants to "political and ideological allies").
178. Id.
179. The same analysis applies with respect to the other forms of governmental retri-
bution suggested by Professor Tobin-political estrangement and "unofficial blacklisting."
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there is no sound reason to expect the potential for abuse to be
much greater without the ban. A church leader prone to curry fa-
vor with a politician on behalf of a church in the absence of the
ban is likewise prone to curry favor with the politician in the
presence of the ban with the hope that his personal endorsement
will positively impact his church.
Finally, the gravest issue is not that permitting churches a po-
litical, partisan voice in elections could slightly enhance the pros-
pect that some churches may receive governmental perks that
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The more pressing issue is that
government is free to fund programs on ideological grounds-as
long as the ideology is legitimately articulated in secular terms. A
presidential administration is inclined to favor the funding of pro-
grams operated by organizations that share the administration's
ideology on matters of public policy, including social programs
with moral implications. Moreover, an organization with an ideo-
logical mission that comports with a presidential administration's
philosophy is also likely to support that President in an election
year. What most enhances the organization's prospects for fund-
ing, however, is not its endorsement, but its ideology. Similarly,
an organization's temptation to compromise its ideology in hopes
of receiving federal funds exists whether or not the ban is in
place. Thus, the ability to receive governmental funding probably
poses a greater risk of encouraging government-preferred religion
than does the ability to support or oppose candidates for public
office. 180
E. The Divisiveness Argument
Professor Tobin also argues that when a church speaks of can-
didates rather than issues, "it leaves the theological realm and
enters the political one."1"' He argues that a church's endorse-
ment of one candidate "can ostracize large portions of its mem-
bership and cause deep divisions." i8 2 He recognizes that "public
180. I take no position in this article on whether the ability of church-related institu-
tions to receive federal funding actually poses a significant threat to the integrity, inde-
pendence, and diversity of churches. I am simply arguing that the ability of churches to
support or oppose political candidates probably poses much less of a threat to their integ-
rity, independence, and diversity than does their ability to receive government funding.
181. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1324.
182. Id.
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policy need not be paternalistic with regard to religion," but
maintains that "churches benefit when they keep a reasonable
distance from candidate elections" because of their potential for
divisiveness. 183
I happen to agree with Professor Tobin that, for many reasons,
including the potential for divisiveness, a church's decision to en-
dorse a particular candidate is usually theologically ill-advised." 4
But I respectfully submit that our personal opinions on the theo-
logical wisdom of a church's endorsement of candidates are ut-
terly irrelevant to the question at hand. The issue is not whether
government needs to be "paternalistic" towards religion. The
First Amendment prohibits the government from "paternalisti-
cally" enacting laws that tell churches what they can and cannot
do because government believes it knows better than they what
fosters healthy churches. There is no more governmental justifi-
cation for the ban on grounds of divisiveness than there would be
for enacting a federal law dictating church practices concerning
contemporary worship style, ordination of women to the pastor-
ate, infant baptism, or teaching the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy.
All of these subjects have proven extremely divisive, but govern-
ment has no legitimate interest in attempting to rid the church of
divisiveness generated by controversy over these issues.
Further, distinguishing these issues on the basis that they in-
volve theological disputes, whereas candidate endorsements gen-
erate political disputes, is to no avail. One comes dangerously
close to subscribing to a false dualism by strictly contrasting the
"theological realm" and the "political one." ' A church that en-
dorses a candidate for theological reasons may indeed have en-
tered the political realm, but it has most assuredly not necessar-
ily exited the theological realm." 6 Governmental policy should
183. Id.
184. Others have noted the divisiveness of electoral politics. See, e.g., Vaughn E.
James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches Failed to Satisfy
the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 76 (2004)
("[Plolitical campaigning is simply too divisive for the Church.").
185. E.g., Tobin, supra note 11, at 1324.
186. See CARTER, supra note 136, at 72 ("As any serious student of religion knows, re-
ligion has no sphere."); Gaffney, supra note 12, at 2 ("Within Judaism, Catholicism, and
Protestantism, the line between religious and political concerns is often a fine one, and
these concerns often overlap."); id. at 35 ("[F]or many religious bodies, what looks like 'po-
litical speech' to outsiders is a form of religious ministry .. "); Garnett, supra note 12, at
776 (stating that Code section 501(c)(3) "invites government to label as 'propaganda' or
'campaign[ing]' what are, for religious believers and communities, expressions of their
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not assume that the two realms have no overlap. One is free to
view theology and politics as such, 87 but one is not free to impose
this view on churches that hold a contrary view.'88 For some
churches, a decision to endorse a candidate whom they believe
will promote social justice and peace, for example, is just as much
a part of their faith as is a decision to renovate houses for hurri-
cane victims. '89 To these churches, political speech is a form of
faith in action. 90
F. The Use of Section 501(c)(4) Affiliates
Professor Tobin's discussion of the use of section 501(c)(4) af-
filiates provides some salutary clarification of his justification for
the ban. He recognizes that the ability of churches to form section
501(c)(4) affiliates "may present some of the same problems" that
he has previously postulated, but alleges that the use of section
501(c)(4) entities by churches is not a great concern.19' First, he
asserts that "there is significantly less risk of oppression by the
government" when the section 501(c)(4) conducts political cam-
paign activity, and notes that the section 501(c)(4) affiliate "can-
not use a church's assets or resources to further its cause."'92 He
faith"); Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When Churches Participate in Political
Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLY 145, 150 (2007) (stating that church involvement in
electoral politics "should be welcomed," and that many churches "consider it part of their
mission to speak out and instruct on matters of public policy and morality"); Totten, supra
note 12, at 310 ("[T]he experience of faith for the vast majority of believers .. .is an ex-
perience of something that places claims on every area of one's life."); West, supra note 5,
at 396 (stating that many churches "reject the idea that religion is limited to the private
realm of individual and family experience").
187. As Professor Carter observes, many wrongly interpret the separation norm to im-
ply this unsupportable dualism. See CARTER, supra note 136, at 73 ("As understood in or-
dinary conversation, the separation of church and state supposes, wrongly, that it is possi-
ble to pick a sphere of life and confine all religion to it. . . ").
188. See Kemmitt, supra note 12, at 174 ("The campaign-activity prohibition also sub-
stantially burdens religion and religious institutions by encroaching upon the ability of the
church to define what is and what is not religious.").
189. See, e.g., Bruce Nolan, A Welcome Tide, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 10,
2007, at 1 (reporting that, to date, Catholic Charities had gutted more than 1600 homes
and apartments; Southern Baptists, more than 1000; and Samaritan's Purse, more than
500); Liz Szabo, Faith Rebuilds House and Soul, USA TODAY, July 19, 2007, at 1D (report-
ing the tremendous contribution of religious organizations to the rebuilding effort in Lou-
isiana and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina; stating that, for many hurricane victims,
every church van with out-of-state plates seems like a beacon of light").
190. See Gaffney, supra note 12, at 21 (stating that "for many religious bodies political
speech has been a form of religious ministry that is central to their religious convictions").
191. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1325-26.
192. Id. at 1325.
2008] 1101
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
also reasons that "there is considerably less risk that the church
will be strong-armed into entering the political fray against its
better judgment" because the section 501(c)(4) affiliate "must be
affirmatively set up by the church." '93 I will refer to these points
as Professor Tobin's "lesser oppression" argument.
Second, Professor Tobin asserts that the use of a section
501(c)(4) entity to engage in political activity "separates, to a de-
gree, the theological and the political" because the section 501
(c)(4) affiliate "cannot preach during services" or exploit the pul-
pit "to tell people how to vote." 9 4 He assigns a "significant differ-
ence" between a pastor who endorses a candidate from the pulpit
and one who does so as a member of a section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion because "It]he former attempts to use the power of the pulpit
and power of God" to sway voters, "while the latter attempts to
encourage like-minded individuals to vote a certain way." 9 5 I will
refer to this line of reasoning as Professor Tobin's "theological
separation" argument.
Although I agree with elements of Professor Tobin's lesser op-
pression argument, ultimately it does not support one categorical
rule for section 501(c)(3) entities-no electioneering-and a dras-
tically different rule for section 501(c)(4) entities-electioneering
permitted. First, I agree that a section 501(c)(4) affiliate cannot
freely use the assets of a section 501(c)(3) sister organization for
political activities; therefore, the ability of the section 501(c)(4)
entity to participate in a political campaign does not itself enable
a politician to pressure a related church to employ its assets to
endorse or oppose a political candidate. But a political candidate
should be no less inclined to pressure a section 501(c)(4) entity to
endorse her than she would be inclined to pressure a section
501(c)(3) entity to do the same in the absence of the ban. If church
members and leaders create and fund a section 501(c)(4) entity
with their individual donations, they therefore face whatever in-
timidation they would otherwise face. The only difference is that
the intimidation is vented though a legal entity distinct from the
church.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1326.
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Further, under the reasonable assumption that the church
members create the section 501(c)(4) affiliate to promote corpo-
rately a political candidate for theological reasons, it is entirely
likely that they consider their donations as part of their tithes or
offerings. A significant portion of their contributions to the sec-
tion 501(c)(4) entity probably would be made to the related
church in the absence of the ban. Accordingly, when a politician
pressures a section 501(c)(4) entity for assistance with its assets,
that otherwise (i.e., in the absence of the ban) would likely consti-
tute church assets, the same type of oppression feared by Profes-
sor Tobin occurs. In both cases, a religiously motivated entity is
encouraged to aid politicians with assets that were donated to
promote a message that is simultaneously political and relig-
iously grounded.196
I agree with the other prong of Professor Tobin's lesser oppres-
sion argument-that under existing law, a politician encounters
some difficulty in exerting pressure on a church to become politi-
cally active when the church has declined to establish a section
501(c)(4) affiliate.197 Of course, a politician could attempt to pres-
sure a church to establish a section 501(c)(4) affiliate, but doing
so requires both money and time. Although a candidate's sup-
porters could offer to supply sufficient funding to create a section
501(c)(4) affiliate and file for recognition of exemption with the
IRS, the whole process is time-consuming, and may not be worth
the effort. Thus, existing law offers some shelter for a consciously
apolitical church.
196. The obvious retort to my argument is that when a candidate seeks assistance from
a church's section 501(c)(4) affiliate, only the affiliate's assets, and not the entirety of
church assets, are available for supporting the candidate. This reply has limited force.
First, because of several background rules of law governing section 501(c)(3) entities, in-
cluding the operational test, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990), and the
prohibition of serving a private interest, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), even without
the ban, it is highly unlikely that a church would remain exempt if it devoted a substan-
tial portion of its assets to support political candidates. See infra Part III.E.1. The general
rules governing section 501(c)(3) entities therefore provide a church with a legal basis for
resisting a candidate's attempts to benefit significantly from church assets. Although a
candidate could still pressure a church for more modest forms of support (e.g., the use of
its pulpit before a worship service or the receipt of a membership roster), I am fairly confi-
dent that a church could invoke other valid, persuasive reasons for politely declining the
favor. Such reasons could be ministerial in nature (e.g., maintaining a proper atmosphere
for worship) or legal in nature (e.g., not permitting the use of church assets for inadequate
compensation).
197. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1323.
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My response is that the self-help mechanisms described previ-
ously would offer similar refuge for a consciously apolitical church
that operates in a world in which the ban is relaxed. 9 ' The
church could amend its articles of incorporation or other govern-
ing instrument1 99 to forbid participation in political campaigns
20
and could require a supra-majority vote (of whatever body is nec-
essary)" 1 to alter such provisions. 2°2 In some states, the articles
could also state that any amendments thereto would become ef-
fective only after some significant period of time has elapsed from
the date that the amendments are approved or filed.2"3 In the
likely event that the church is incorporated, it will often be the
case that such amendments must conform to state statutory law
and will be effective only upon filing with the office of the Secre-
tary of State in which the church is incorporated. °4 This whole
process would consume substantial time and could easily require
the assistance of legal counsel (and the payment of legal fees).
These self-help measures therefore create obstacles to electioneer-
ing similar to those associated with the formation of a section
501(c)(4) affiliate under current law. Thus, if a deliberately apo-
198. See supra text accompanying note 169.
199. For examples of state law authorizing amendments to a non-profit corporation's
articles of incorporations, see, for example, CAL. CORP. CODE § 5810(a) (West 1990); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/110.05(a) (West 2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 180, § 7 (Lex-
isNexis 2005); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 801(a) (Consol. 2002); TEX. BUS. ORGS.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.051(a), 22.105, 22.164 (Vernon 2007); REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§ 10.01 (1986).
200. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 9131 (2007) (authorizing the articles of incorporation
of a religious corporation to limit its powers); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/102.10
(b)(1)(iv) (permitting the articles of incorporation of a nonprofit corporation to limit the
powers of the corporation); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 801(b)(3) (permitting
amendments to the certificate of incorporation to change the powers of a nonprofit corpo-
ration); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 3.005(b) (stating that a certificate of formation may
include provisions "not inconsistent with law" relating to the affairs of the organization);
REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(3)(ii) (1987) (permitting the articles of incor-
poration of a nonprofit corporation to limit the powers of the corporation).
201. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/110.20(d); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP.
LAW § 615(a)(2) (Consol. 2002); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.162 (Vernon 2007); REV.
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.03(a).
202. In some states, the articles could also require approval of a designated person be-
fore the amendments are effective. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5812(a), 9132(c)(4); REV.
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.30.
203. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5008(c) (West 1990); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §
4.052, 4.053 (Vernon 2007); REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.23(b) (1987).
204. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5814(a); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/110.30,
105/110.35(a); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 180, § 7; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 803(a);
TEX. BuS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 3.056(a), 4.001(a); REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §
10.05.
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litical church desires to buffer itself against political pressure, it
can take affirmative steps to do so. It need not rely on an act of
Congress for an excuse to abstain from electioneering.
Professor Tobin's "theological separation" argument also does
not justify the ban. His assumption that a pastor who speaks on
behalf of a church's 501(c)(4) affiliate does not attempt "to use the
power of the pulpit and power of God"205 is suspect. To assume
that a pastor who endorses a candidate as an officer or member of
a section 501(c)(4) entity does so apart from "the pulpit" or with-
out implying that one may be held accountable to God for how one
votes is peculiar. Often, a pastor endorses a candidate for theo-
logical reasons (e.g., to promote the life of the unborn, to crusade
against the death penalty, to improve the conditions of the poor,
to fight racial discrimination, or to strive for world peace). Under
current law, a pastor is perfectly free to endorse a candidate for
theological reasons on behalf of himself or on behalf of a section
501(c)(4) entity affiliated with a church. The pastor can even do
so after identifying himself as the pastor of his church so as to en-
sure that people know precisely who is endorsing the candi-
date.2 °6 Moreover, a pastor carries the pulpit with him wherever
he goes-figuratively, but ever so surely.20 7 Countless people are
interested in his opinion because of his clerical position and life-
time commitment to a higher calling, and he is likely to explain
his position on a candidate just as he would before a church con-
gregation. The general public is unlikely to assign enormous sig-
nificance to the distinction between a pastor's endorsement on
behalf of his church and his endorsement on behalf of himself or a
church affiliate. What matters most is that this pastor has some-
thing to say about a candidate for theological reasons. Many, and
probably most, people will assume that the pastor has formed his
views in accordance with his perception of the will of God,
whether he addresses them in a church sanctuary or on the
courthouse lawn.
Consequently, the effect of the ban is not necessarily to prevent
a pastor from relying on the pulpit or the power of God in an at-
205. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1325-26.
206. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (Situation 3).
207. See Samansky, supra note 186, at 154 (stating that when a minister believes that
the theological tenets of a religious body compel voting a certain way, the minister's
.communication of that conclusion to her congregants has the authority of her position and
learning").
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tempt to influence a person's vote. Rather, the effect of the ban,
as interpreted by the IRS, is to prevent a church leader from do-
ing so in a church service or in some other official church me-
dium. It requires little imagination to conclude that a congrega-
tion will learn of a vocal pastor's theological position on a
candidate regardless of the public forum in which he chooses to
20express his views. °8 Rather than protecting parishioners from a
pastor who tells them how to vote, the ban often just changes how
the pastor will go about doing so.
G. The Democratic Values Argument
Professor Tobin's final argument in favor of the ban as it ap-
plies specifically to churches is that "[s]ubsidizing the entry of
churches into politics artificially increases the power of religious
institutions" and renders them "overrepresented in political de-
bates and political life."2 °9 Relying on public choice theory,210 Pro-
fessor Tobin argues that "[a] system that tips the scale in favor of
one group over another" may "challenge majority governance" and
"trample on the rights of minorities."21' Moreover, he asserts that
with new-found power resulting from a removal of the ban,
churches will become more vulnerable to corruption." 2 He con-
templates that churches may modify their doctrine in order to re-
ceive government funding, churches may endorse candidates to
enhance their prospects of receiving funding, and religious lead-
ers may accept money personally (rather than on behalf of their
churches) in exchange for a political endorsement.2 3
This final argument is quite problematic. First, it smacks of an
internal inconsistency. If, contrary to what I believe, relaxing the
ban would dramatically increase the power of churches, it is odd
that these churches with additional clout would suddenly be more
prone to compromise church doctrine in an effort to obtain federal
funding. If anything, one would expect a more powerful church
208. Cf. id. at 153-54 (describing an account of a New York rabbi who expresses a pref-
erence for a political candidate, and then his selection is reported to his orthodox commu-
nity).
209. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1326.
210. See id. at 1326-27.
211. Id. at 1328-29.
212. See id. at 1329-30.
213. See id.
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lobby to compromise less on church doctrine, for now these potent
churches are, as Professor Tobin argues supposedly better at im-
posing their will on society.214
Moreover, even if relaxing the ban would increase the power of
churches, it hardly follows that minorities would be oppressed.
There is simply no collective "will of the churches" on most issues
of public policy.215 Some are pro-life, others pro-choice. Some favor
the death penalty on theological grounds, others oppose it. The
same is true of the war in Iraq, legislation concerning civil un-
ions, and many other issues. Churches as a whole plainly do not
form a united theological front,21 6 so it is difficult to imagine that
their voice in electoral politics would lead to the oppression of mi-
norities.
If the concern is primarily about federal money, that problem
already exists.21 7 In brief, a desire to receive federal funding is
more likely to lead to compromising church doctrine than is the
ability to endorse or oppose a political candidate. Further, as pre-
viously discussed, current law allows pastors to endorse a candi-
214. See id. at 1326.
215. See Gaffney, supra note 12, at 37 ("Exempt religious organizations by no means
agree with one another about many of the issues on today's political agenda .. "); Totten,
supra note 12, at 308 (stating that "the broad range of political viewpoints expressed from
pulpits" undermines claims that taxpayers are forced to subsidize objectionable view-
points).
216. Steffen Johnson has stated the point lucidly:
Some might fear that widening the doorway to churches' involvement in poli-
tics would tilt the public debate in a certain direction-skewing it, for exam-
ple, either in favor of the Reverend Jesse Jackson or those who make up the
"religious right." Such concerns seem unfounded. Churches' views on political
matters, and their approach to expressing them, vary widely. Some churches
believe in isolating themselves from the government, other churches believe
in submitting to the government, and still other churches believe in witness-
ing to the government. Members of the National Council of Churches or the
Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council are likely to hold views quite
different from those of the United States Catholic Conference. Congregations
in major metropolitan areas are likely to view political issues differently than
those in rural areas, congregations in the suburbs are likely to have a differ-
ent outlook than those in the inner city, and congregations made up of racial
minorities are likely to favor different policies and candidates than those
made up of whites. Thus, there is a healthy pluralism of approaches to in-
volvement in politics in American churches-but remarkable agreement on
the fact that faith has something to say about the policies and the people who
appear on the political stage.
Johnson, supra note 12, at 884-85 (citations omitted).
217. See supra text accompanying note 176.
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date personally or on behalf of a section 501(c)(4) affiliate, 218 so
there is already a risk that a pastor prone to corruption would of-
fer an endorsement to benefit himself or his church financially.
Relaxing the ban should not significantly heighten this risk.
Apart from these objections, the assumption that the ban is
necessary to prevent churches from enjoying disproportionate po-
litical power on account of their supposed "subsidy" is in some
tension with current law. Churches may already lobby Congress,
both directly and at the grass roots level.219 If modest lobbying by
churches has not jeopardized the fabric of United States democ-
racy, I question whether some modest degree of political cam-
paign participation by churches would do so. In any event, Pro-
fessor Tobin's arguments do not justify one moderately permis-
sive rule for lobbying, but a categorical prohibition against politi-
cal campaign activity.
Moreover, even if one assumes that tax exemption and the
charitable contributions deduction give rise to a subsidy, the
amount of this supposed subsidy varies greatly with numerous
factors.22 ° One such factor is the number of donations derived
from persons who do not itemize deductions. As a group, relative
to other charitable donees, churches receive a high percentage of
their assets from individuals who are of low and moderate in-
come-those less likely to itemize deductions.22 ' Thus, compared
to many other charities, it is likely that churches are not nearly
as "subsidized."222 If anything, the ban disproportionately impairs
the political voice of churches, because it forbids them from en-
dorsing a candidate notwithstanding that they are less subsidized
than many other charities. 
2 23
Further, the ban does not merely level the playing field be-
tween charities and other entities. 224 Because the penalty for vio-
218. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
219. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (permitting attempts to influence legislation that do
not comprise a "substantial part" of the charitable organization's activities).
220. See supra Part I.C.1.
221. See Aprill, supra note 31, at 845-46; Hatfield, supra note 4, at 157-58.
222. Churches are likely less subsidized not only because they are substantially sup-
ported by non-itemizers, but also because most of their income derives from donations that
would be excludible from gross income under Code section 102 if they were not exempt
under Code section 501(c)(3). See Hatfield, supra note 4, at 155.
223. Cf. Aprill, supra note 31, at 845 ("[C]hurches often bear the burden of the election-
eering prohibition without their contributors enjoying the benefit of a tax deduction.").
224. See supra Part I.C.2.
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lating the ban is the loss of exemption on all entity income, as
well as the forfeiture of the ability to receive tax-deductible con-
tributions entirely-not just those employed for political pur-
poses-the ban actually impairs the political voice of charities, in-
cluding churches, relative to other entities. Were parity in politics
really desired, section 501(c)(3) entities that choose to expend
funds to elect a candidate for public office would need to compen-
sate the government at most only for that portion of their subsidy
diverted to political ends. To state the point more bluntly, if Pro-
fessor Tobin is correct to invoke public choice theory in this con-
text, one may plausibly argue the ban disadvantages churches
relative to certain other entities and renders churches prone to
oppression by other elements of society.
H. Synopsis
In summary, Professor Tobin has raised some thought-
provoking points, and I applaud his originality and effort. Profes-
sor Tobin, however, has not made a convincing case that the ban
is necessary to protect the integrity or effectiveness of churches,
or to preserve a healthy democracy. His arguments (1) tend to of-
fend the norm of separation of church and state more than they
support it; (2) do not fully account for the realities of political life
even with the ban; (3) do not explain why Code section 501(c)(3)'s
more permissive rule for lobbying, and the ability of religious
leaders to make political endorsements on behalf of themselves,
do not create the type of problems purportedly avoided by the
ban;2 25 (4) seem to ignore that the ban may tend to hinder, rather
than liberate, churches in their ministries of proclamation; (5) do
not grapple with the inherently co-opting effect of demanding
that churches abstain from theologically grounded political en-
dorsements on penalty of losing tax-favored status; (6) do not take
into account the protections afforded by the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment; (7) do not take into account the self-help
mechanisms available to churches that would prefer to remain
apolitical were the ban relaxed; (8) do not consider the actual,
minimal subsidy likely received by churches relative to other en-
225. In fairness to Professor Tobin, his article attempts only to justify the ban on par-
ticipation in political campaigns by charities, not all other elements of federal tax law gov-
erning the political activities of charities and their officials. Perhaps Professor Tobin
would prefer to modify many features of tax law in this area to better address his con-
cerns. After such modifications, some of my responses might no longer apply.
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tities; and (9) do not acknowledge that the ban actually imposes a
harsher tax penalty on the political expression of churches and
other charities than that imposed on other entities by federal tax
law.
III. REPLYING TO PROFESSOR TOBIN'S SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS
APPLICABLE TO CHARITIES IN GENERAL:
POINT AND COUNTERPOINT
Professor Tobin also justifies the ban as it applies to the entire
class of charities. He offers five major arguments: (1) participa-
tion in political campaigns is inconsistent with the rationales for
providing charities a subsidy; (2) participation in political cam-
paigns can impair an organization's independence; (3) participa-
tion in political campaigns can impair an organization's objective
educational mission; (4) participation in political campaigns is in-
consistent with an organization's charitable mission; and (5) per-
mitting participation in political campaigns by section 501(c)(3)
entities is structurally unsound.226 I address each argument in
turn.
A. The Subsidy Argument
Professor Tobin begins his analysis of the ban as it applies to
charities in general with a selective primer on the subsidy theory.
He observes two rationales for subsidizing section 501(c)(3) enti-
ties: charities provide services and supply goods that government
otherwise would offer; and charities promote the general welfare
of the public and therefore deserve a government subsidy.227 Pro-
fessor Tobin observes that the ban is consistent with the first ra-
tionale because the federal government generally does not as-
226. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1335-39.
227. See id. at 1335-36. Professor Tobin also acknowledges that section 501(c)(3) enti-
ties are charities that receive "special status" under the common law of charitable trusts,
but states that nothing in the common law suggests that contributions to charities should
be deductible for income tax purposes, or that they should receive a subsidy and the ability
to engage in electioneering. See id. Obviously, the deductibility of charitable contributions
under United States federal income tax law is not within the scope of the common law, so I
would certainly not dispute that the common law does not compel any certain tax treat-
ment for charities. This observation, however, does not mean that the rationale for special
treatment of charitable trusts under the common law has no relevance to federal income
tax law and policy. Because a full exploration of this subject is unnecessary for purposes of
replying to Professor Tobin, this article does not explore the issue further.
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sume responsibility for funding political campaigns.228 I concur. I
also, however, agree with Professor Tobin that this first rationale
does not truly justify the tax exemption of charities;229 therefore,
the consistency of the ban with this rationale is inconsequential.
More problematic is Professor Tobin's assertion that permitting
charities to participate in political campaigns is inconsistent with
the public welfare rationale. He reasons that participation in a
political campaign "necessarily forces [a charity] to take sides,"
and that even when the charity considers its endorsement to
promote the welfare of the public, "surely the people on the other
side disagree."230 He contrasts the discussion of issues, which he
considers educational, with the endorsement of candidates, which
he believes negates the status of charities as "independent, objec-
,,231tive voices.
With respect, I proffer that this line of reasoning fails to ac-
count for the nature of the charitable sector and how it promotes
the public welfare. The vast charitable sector 23 2 is quite di-
verse.2 33 It serves society not by means of uniformity, but with a
variety of visions and methods. One charity seeks to lessen teen
pregnancy through abstinence education, whereas another does
so by providing free birth control. One charity strives to treat
brain cancer patients with chemotherapy, whereas another does
so with alternative, experimental drugs shunned by the majority
of oncologists. One elementary school teaches students how to
read by recognizing common words, whereas another trains stu-
dents to be "hooked on phonics." One religious organization
teaches that Jesus is "the way, the truth, the life," and the only
228. See id. at 1336.
229. See id. at 1336 n.98.
230. Id. at 1336.
231. Id.
232. The charitable sector consists of more than one million entities. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, DATA BOOK 2006, at 56 tbl.25 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil
06databk.pdf.
233. See Elizabeth T. Boris, The Nonprofit Sector in the 1990s, in PHILANTHROPY AND
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 1, 9-12 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas
Ehrlich eds., 1999); David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption-
Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITTSBURGH TAX
REV. 1, 24 (2006) ("[T]he charitable tax exemption allows for diversity and experimenta-
tion that often lead to production of undiscovered values."); Johnny Rex Buckles, Reform-
ing the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 463-66 (2005); Albert M. Sacks,
The Role of Philanthropy: An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 524 (1960).
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way to the Father, 34 whereas another teaches that there is no
God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet. 235 The list is
nearly infinite. Although in each case one charity believes its
methods and mission promote the public welfare best, "surely the
people on the other side disagree. 236 To advance competing vi-
sions does not negate the essential nature of charity. 237 This fact
remains true when a charity believes that its vision is better
served by one candidate than another, and believes it strongly
enough to say so publicly.
Nor is it true that endorsing a candidate need be less objective
or informative than advocating positions on issues. A charity that
fully discusses an issue and then ultimately takes a position on it
is not necessarily more educational than a charity that fully dis-
cusses the strengths and weaknesses of several political candi-
dates and then ultimately endorses one.238 Can political endorse-
ments be nothing but partisan, unreflective rubber stamps? Yes.
But so can issue advocacy. Further, the less objective and reflec-
tive a charity is in its endorsement, the less influence the en-
dorsement will exert. Thus, a charity that desires to persuade the
public with an endorsement has an incentive to base its conclu-
sion on facts and rational analysis.
Finally, it is worth recalling that other rationales for the fed-
eral income tax exemption of charities exist. Importantly, under
the base-defining theories discussed briefly above,239 there is no
subsidy to charities from government by virtue of Code sections
170 and 501(c)(3), and therefore the ban cannot be justified on
234. See John 14:6 (King James); see also Acts 4:12 (King James) (stating that salva-
tion is available in Jesus alone); Acts 16:31 (King James) ("Believe on the Lord Jesus
Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house."). Although the message of Jesus and His
apostles is exclusive in claiming that only through Him can one experience reconciliation
with God, the message is inclusive in stating that the offer of reconciliation extends to all
people of every nationality, ethnicity and culture. See, e.g., Matt. 28:19; John 3:16; Rom.
10:11-13; Col. 3:11.
235. This belief is the first of the five pillars of faith in Islam. See JOSH MCDOWELL &
DON STEWART, HANDBOOK OF TODAY'S RELIGIONS 390-91 (1983).
236. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1336.
237. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (stating that tax exemptions serve the important role of "encouraging diverse, indeed
often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints").
238. I am not arguing, however, that a balanced presentation of the strengths and
weaknesses of various political candidates, culminating in an endorsement, should be con-
sidered an "educational" purpose under Code section 501(c)(3). Such an approach would
present an intolerably high risk of abuse.
239. See supra Part I.B.
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subsidy grounds. Moreover, versions of the subsidy theory not
discussed by Professor Tobin also exist.2 0 Even if one were to
agree with Professor Tobin that the ban is consistent with the
public welfare version of the subsidy theory, the ban would hardly
rest on firm ground. One would need to justify the ban under
other versions of the subsidy theory, as well as under base-
defining theories-or at least explain why these other theories
should be rejected.
B. The Independence Argument
Professor Tobin briefly reapplies his co-option argument dis-
cussed initially in the context of churches to charities in general.
He fears that if charities can participate in political campaigns,
otherwise non-partisan charities could be co-opted, and thereby
lose their ability to serve as independent voices.241 I have re-
sponded to these concerns in detail above in the context of
churches,242 and need not repeat the many reasons why this ar-
gument is problematic.
It is likely, however, that charities as a broad class, including
quasi-religious organizations, are somewhat more prone than
churches to losing a degree of independence if they engage in
electioneering.243 If parishioners believe that church leadership is
compromising the faith, they will probably disassociate with the
leadership (one way or another). While stakeholders in a non-
church charity are free to do the same, they may not be as quick
to spot "heresy" as their ecclesial counterparts, for whom purity of
doctrine is often of paramount importance.
This increased risk, however, does not justify the ban. First,
the foundational rules governing section 501(c)(3) entities require
them to be organized and operated for an exempt purpose.24 An
organization would not maintain exemption if its purpose became
240. For a discussion of most of these theories, see Colombo, supra note 31, at 682-90,
696-701.
241. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1337. Professor Tobin is not alone in expressing this
concern. See, e.g., Pablo Eisenberg, Charities Should Remain Nonpolitical, CHRON. PHI-
LANTHROPY, June 28, 2007, at 53 (opining that discarding the ban would cause nonprofit
groups to lose their independence from politicians and government).
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. Cf. CARTER, supra note 136, at 54-58 (observing the pressure on politically active
organizations that are "putatively religious" to lose their religious focus).
244. See infra Part III.E.1.
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significantly political. Second, there are several alternatives to
the ban that would permit charities to retain a voice in electoral
politics without giving them unbounded discretion to support and
oppose candidates.245 Just because government has a role in pre
serving the independence of the charitable sector does not mean
that government must effectively prohibit charities from express-
ing a voice in elections.
C. The Objective Educational Mission Argument
Professor Tobin next revisits his concern that the objectivity of
charities would decline were the ban repealed. 246 He admits that
educational organizations may "still have a biased slant on is-
sues," but apparently accepts the status quo because "the infor-
mation comes from a nonpartisan organization that is not trying
to elect a candidate" and "there are some checks designed to pro-
vide that some level of objectivity is contained in the educational
literature."247
I have already questioned the basic concern with objectivity
above.24 In addition, I offer the following. First, if an organiza-
tion plainly has a biased slant on issues, it is doubtful that the
ability to endorse candidates would significantly propel the or-
ganization to even greater bias. The bias is extant. Although that
bias may well dictate what candidate the organization endorses,
the endorsement of the candidate would not necessarily cause the
organization to become more biased on the issues.
Second, even without the ban, the most important legal checks
that ensure that an educational organization is indeed educa-
tional under current law should remain intact. Currently, the IRS
employs a methodology test to ensure that an educational organi-
zation is not merely a vehicle for propaganda.249 The same test
could apply if the organization endorses a candidate for public of-
fice. Indeed, one could even apply the test only to the organiza-
tion's issue advocacy, and not permit any communications con-
cerning a candidate to qualify as "educational" per se. This
245. See infra Parts III.E.1, III.E.2.
246. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1337.
247. Id.
248. See supra text accompanying note 233.
249. See Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
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approach would offer the same legal checks against bias that ex-
ist under current law.
Finally, the ability to endorse a candidate necessarily sub-
sumes the ability to decline to endorse any candidate. Thus, an
educational organization that is genuinely non-partisan, and de-
sires to remain so, would be better able to distinguish itself from
its more partisan counterparts if the ban is relaxed. With the ban,
no organization-even one led by those with a hidden political
agenda-can endorse or oppose a political candidate. But in the
absence of the ban, the more partisan entities are likely to en-
dorse and oppose candidates. Correlatively, in the absence of the
ban, the genuinely non-partisan educational organization can
demonstrate its objectivity in a manner not possible under cur-
rent law; because it is free to endorse or oppose a candidate, its
refusal to do so evinces objectivity. By facilitating the ability of
non-partisan charities to signal their independence to the public,
the repeal of the ban may actually enhance the influence of non-
partisan charities as they communicate their objective analysis.
D. The Charitable Mission Argument
Professor Tobin next argues that "political intervention is not
consistent with our current and common definition of charita-
ble."25° First, he states that supporting a political candidate "does
not fit within" the common law definition of charity.251 His obser-
vation is correct, but irrelevant. Charities engage in many activi-
ties that are not inherently "charitable" within the meaning of
the common law. Such activities include investment manage-
ment, fundraising, and even the payment of compensation to em-
ployees. These activities are usually perfectly legitimate, how-
ever, because they are the instrumental means through which a
charity accomplishes its charitable mission.
Professor Tobin concedes "that political intervention may be a
means of promoting one's charitable mission," but counters that
"charities are incorrect in assuming that any means of promoting
a charitable mission must be charitable."5 2 Again, the comment
misses the point. The point is not that political campaign partici-
250. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1338.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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pation necessarily furthers a charitable mission. The point is that
it can further a charitable mission. One might as well object to
the ability of a charity to maintain an endowment and invest its
assets. A charity that invests its entire portfolio in a single, high-
risk, start-up company primarily to provide capital to the best
friend of the charity's executive director is hardly using its assets
to further its charitable mission. But this potential misuse of in-
vestment assets does not mean that investing cannot further a
charitable mission. Moreover, the pursuit of investment returns
could so dominate a charity's operations that the charitable mis-
sion becomes secondary to the investment function. Under such
circumstances, the charity no longer remains exempt from federal
income taxation.253 But this observation does not dictate that the
Code prohibit section 501(c)(3) entities from making investments.
Similarly, the potential for engaging in political activities in a
manner that is inconsistent with charitable status does not itself
justify the categorical ban.2"4
Professor Tobin also argues that "support of a political candi-
date may interfere with a charity's core mission," and illustrates
the point with an individual who donates money to a food pantry
that then uses the donation to support a political candidate whom
the donor disfavors.255 He claims that the charity has applied
funds "for a purpose that, at least to the donor, was outside the
charity's purpose."256 While I agree with Professor Tobin's as-
sessment of the donor's opinion, I hardly agree that his hypo-
thetical makes his case. First, donors would likely disagree with
countless decisions affecting donated funds were they aware of
them.25 7 The issue is not unique to the political funding context. If
donors do not desire that their donations be used for a specific
purpose (be it to support or oppose a political candidate, to con-
struct a new facility, or to pay legal fees), the solution is for do-
253. Cf. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 186 (stating that a charitable organiza-
tion that derived rents from a commercial office building was tax exempt because it con-
ducted "a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial resources").
254. As discussed below, several legal checks, both existing and proposed, would pre-
vent the exploitation of charities for political ends. See infra Parts III.E.1, III.E.2.
255. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1338.
256. Id.
257. Examples (to name just a few) include: what employees to hire, what individuals
to aid, what forms of assistance to provide, how much assistance to provide any one per-
son, what investments to make, how much compensation to pay personnel, what suppliers
of goods and services to patronize, how much office equipment to buy, what fundraising
methods to employ, and what legal counsel to retain.
1116 [Vol. 42:1057
20081 BAN ON PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
nors to so specify in correspondence or formal agreements accom-
panying donations.258
Moreover, although the voice of donors-especially small do-
nors-in charitable affairs is important,259 the ban does not en-
sure respect for their voice, nor does lifting the ban necessarily
stifle their voice. As Professor Tobin seems to recognize, the effect
on donations of lifting the ban is indeterminate. Professor Tobin
speculates that charities that endorse political candidates may
encounter difficulty in raising funds.26 ° If he is correct, that sim-
ply means that the "market for donations" is signaling to politi-
cally active charities that they should adhere to their historic ac-
tivities. One would expect charities that struggle for donations
either to repent of their political activities, or eventually close
their doors as their similarly situated, apolitical sister charities
attract better funding. In either case, the wishes of donors have
impacted the behavior of charities.
Professor Tobin also recognizes that some donors might give to
a charity only if it endorses a particular candidate261 (or, I would
add, only if it does not endorse the wrong candidate). Again, if he
is right, it does not follow that the ban is necessary to protect the
desires of donors. One would simply expect that donors would
support charities that do not offend donors' political judgment.
Only if donors pressured charities to become politically active
against their better judgment would a problem arise.26 2 That is
not a problem of defeating donor preferences, however; it is a
problem of changing the character of a charitable organization's
operations. I do believe that some legal protections are necessary
to guard against this risk. As explained in the next section of this
article, however, those legal protections need not include the cur-
rent law's ban.
258. Professor Tobin observes that donors could restrict their gifts in the manner sug-
gested but never explains why doing so is insufficient to respect their preferences. See
Tobin, supra note 11, at 1338.
259. See The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan, supra note 32, at 1314-17.
260. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1338.
261. See id.
262. A quite different problem is that donor discipline may not serve as an effective
check on many charities. See Not Even a Peep?, supra note 14, at 1088-89.
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E. The Structural Soundness Argument
Professor Tobin's final argument is that allowing charitable or-
ganizations to participate in political campaigns is "structurally
unsound." '263 Professor Tobin argues that lifting the ban would
render section 501(c)(3) entities the vehicle of choice for making
political contributions because donations to them are deductible
under Code section 170(c).264 He believes that there is no good
reason to subsidize the electioneering of section 501(c)(3) organi-
zations and thereby impart them with preferential status in the
political process.2 65 He foresees that lifting the ban would cause
section 501(c)(3) entities to be conduits for political campaign con-
tributions266 and greatly increase their political power. 267
As a threshold matter, it is important to identify a subtle dis-
tinction between two concerns that Professor Tobin has ex-
pressed. One is the concern that, in the absence of the ban, chari-
ties could be used as conduits to channel political contributions to
further private interests. This article refers to the potential for
this abuse as the "private interest/conduit" issue. A related, but
distinct, concern is that, without the ban, government would pro-
vide section 501(c)(3) entities (or donors thereto) with a unique
"subsidy" to endorse or oppose political candidates. This article
refers to this concern as the "subsidized electioneering" issue.
Although I do not fully embrace Professor Tobin's subsidy
analysis, I agree with him that, without legal checks, donors are
likely to try to channel political contributions through charitable
organizations on account of the deductibility of contributions
thereto. I also agree with Professor Tobin that the risk of this
scenario is serious.2 6' This concern, however, does not justify the
ban. In this section of the article, I discuss in detail my points of
agreement and disagreement with Professor Tobin, and explain
why alternatives to the ban are superior.
263. Tobin, supra note 11, at 1339.
264. See id.; I.R.C. § 170(c) (2000).
265. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1339-42.
266. See id. at 1339.
267. See id. at 1341.
268. See Not Even a Peep?, supra note 14, at 1085-89 (discussing the private interests
served in the absence of the ban).
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1. The Private Interest/Conduit Issue
The ban on electioneering largely prevents charitable organiza-
tions from serving two "private interests"--the private interest of
candidates and the private interests of their supporters (who de-
sire to elect politicians inclined to further their supporters' agen-
das).269 The theoretical concern raised by the private inter-
est/conduit issue is that, without the ban, electioneering by
charities could become nothing more than electioneering by those
who fund the charities-their politically motivated donors.27°
Strictly speaking, however, this concern is not that electioneering
by charities is necessarily illegitimate. It is legitimate as long as
(1) the charity decides whether, and to what extent, to participate
in political campaigns, and (2) its decision can be trusted as hav-
ing been made primarily to further an exempt purpose rather
than the private interests of individuals, such as donors or candi-
dates. Because I have elsewhere discussed in some detail the se-
riousness of the risk that charities could be exploited to further
private interests without some legal safeguards, 71 my comments
here are brief.2 72
I concede that, entirely apart from the ban, existing law offers
some level of protection against the risk that donors and the can-
didates that they support will successfully use charities as mere
conduits for political campaign contributions. First, the general
background rules governing section 501(c)(3) entities preclude an
organization from obtaining and maintaining its exemption when
it is organized or operated to serve a non-exempt purpose-such
as promoting one or more political candidates-to any significant
degree. Under the organizational test, an organization is organ-
ized "exclusively" for an exempt purpose only if its governing
document limits the organization's purposes to an exempt pur-
269. See id. at 1086; Chisolm, supra note 12, at 342-44.
270. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 893-900 (observing that the conduit issue "is cer-
tainly an important public policy consideration," but discussing why generalizing the sig-
nificance of the concern is difficult).
271. See Not Even a Peep?, supra note 14, at 1085-89.
272. Consistent with the community income theory of the charity income tax exemption
and the charitable contributions deduction, the favorable tax treatment of charities and
donations thereto assumes that charities are truly acting as agents of the community.
When charities cease to do so, they forfeit their special tax status. Thus, a charity that is
used primarily as a mere conduit for political contributions does not merit recognition as a
section 501(c)(3) entity.
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pose.273 Under the operational test, an organization is operated
"exclusively" for an exempt purpose "only if it engages primarily
in activities which accomplish" an exempt purpose.2 74 The test is
failed "if more than an insubstantial part of its activities" do not
further an exempt purpose. 
275
Although the organizational test is easily satisfied, the opera-
tional test is more difficult to pass. For example, if a charity has
expended one-half of its time and resources on political endorse-
ments, a court could readily conclude that the organization does
not "engage primarily" in activities which accomplish an exempt
purpose, or that "more than an insubstantial part of its activities"
do not further an exempt purpose. At some point, the scale of po-
litical activities relative to activities that inherently further an
exempt purpose tends to negate the charity's claim that its elec-
tioneering is merely an instrumental means of accomplishing an
exempt purpose.
2 76
Under existing federal income tax law, the private benefit doc-
trine provides another measure of protection against the exploita-
tion of charities to further the private interest of candidates.
Charitable organizations are exempt from federal income tax only
if they serve a public, rather than a private, interest. 277 In Ameri-
273. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i)(a) (as amended in 1990).
274. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
275. See id.
276. Cf., e.g., Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 806-07 (Ct. Cl.
1961) (holding that a religious publishing organization failed the operational test, stating
that the "crucial factor" is "that the sales aspect of plaintiffs work looms so large as to
overshadow all else"); Rev. Rul. 77-366, 1977-2 C.B. 192 (ruling that an organization con-
ducting ocean cruises and providing both religious education and recreational activities is
not operated exclusively for exempt purposes). Because the determination of whether an
organization has violated the operational test is a fact-intensive, subjective inquiry, it is
conceivable that the test would be applied inconsistently by the judiciary and the IRS in
the absence of the ban. If this potential proved to be a real problem in the absence of the
ban, more objective tests could be adopted. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 298.
277. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii). The requirement that charities not serve a
private interest is known as the private benefit doctrine. It is related to, but distinct from,
the statutory prohibition in section 501(c)(3) against private inurement of a charitable or-
ganization's net earnings for the benefit of any "private shareholder or individual." See
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). The prohibition against private inurement of net earnings applies
only to transactions between a charity and those with some type of "insider" status with
the charity (i.e., someone with functional control over the charity's operations). See United
Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1999). The private bene-
fit doctrine is much broader. For a concise summary of the private benefit doctrine and the
prohibition of private inurement, see Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts Soar
Above Twin Towers: A Federal Income Tax Solution to the Problem of Publicly Solicited
Surplus Donations Raised for a Designated Charitable Purpose, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827,
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can Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, the United States Tax
Court interpreted this requirement to mean that a purportedly
charitable organization fails to qualify for federal income tax ex-
emption if more than an insubstantial part of its activities further
the non-exempt purpose of serving a private interest. 28 In this
case, a school trained students for careers in managing political
campaigns. 2' 9 Approximately 80% of the school's graduating class
worked on political campaigns in 1986.280 The school received
funding exclusively from the National Republican Congressional
Trust, offered a curriculum focused on Republican politics, and
was initially governed by a board of directors who were promi-
nent Republicans. 21 The Tax Court held that the organization
failed to qualify under Code section 501(c)(3) because its training
activities were intended to and did serve private interests-the
Republican party and its candidates.2 2
A supposed "charity" that devotes a substantial portion of its
resources to supporting or opposing candidates for public office
would likely run afoul of the private benefit doctrine. Candidates
who receive endorsements from a charity receive benefits similar
to those who employed the students trained by the school in
American Campaign Academy. Further, a practice of devoting
substantial resources to the endorsement and opposition of politi-
cal candidates suggests a non-exempt purpose of the endorsing
entity, just as the practice of placing graduates in the political
campaigns of Republican candidates suggested a non-exempt
purpose of the school in American Campaign Academy. Therefore,
in the absence of the ban, the private benefit doctrine would
likely thwart the gross exploitation of section 501(c)(3) entities by
political candidates.
The private benefit doctrine is less suited to prevent the exploi-
tation of a charity for the benefit of its donors and managers who
influence a charity's decision to endorse or oppose political candi-
dates. As applied to a charitable organization's donors or manag-
ers who anticipate obtaining political favors from the candidates
supported by the charity, establishing the presence of private
1844-46 (2003).
278. 92 T.C. 1053, 1079 (1989).
279. Id. at 1055.
280. Id. at 1060.
281. Id. at 1070.
282. Id. at 1079.
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benefit is difficult. Both the IRS and the courts would be hard-
pressed to find the presence of such private benefit when the
charity's governing board and officers offer plausible, but false,
justifications for their participation in political campaigns. More-
over, if the charity's political activities are highly selective, such
that it endorses and opposes only a few candidates occasionally, it
would be difficult to conclude that the charity has furthered the
private interests of political candidates as a substantial part of its
activities.
Consequently, some legal safeguard in addition to the private
benefit doctrine is necessary to ensure that, if the ban is repealed,
those who exert significant influence over the operations of chari-
ties will not exploit them to further their own selfish interests. A
number of approaches are available. One approach is to distin-
gnish between (1) a charitable organization that is controlled by
directors who are independent of one another, the charity's offi-
cers, and its substantial donors, and makes political campaign
expenditures totally independently of non-fiduciaries who are
able to exercise substantial influence over the charity (and per-
sons related to such non-fiduciaries); and (2) any charity that fails
these tests of independence.2 3 Although neither type of charita-
ble organization need be prohibited from supporting or opposing
political candidates on penalty of forfeiting federal income tax ex-
emption, only the former category would generally be able to do
so free from tax.2" Charitable organizations that fail the tests of
independence, or in some cases their directors or even non-
fiduciaries who exercise substantial influence over the organiza-
tions, would pay an excise tax on the charities' political cam-
paign-related expenditures. 2"5 The proposed excise tax would dis-
courage the exploitation of non-independent charities for private
gain.28 6 This system would not tax the political expenditures of
charities that are truly independent, both in their governing
board's composition and in the way they actually function relative
to donors and other people of influence, under the theory that in-
dependent charities are less prone to exploitation by a few key in-
siders.2"7 In other words, independent charities are more likely to
283. See Not Even a Peep?, supra note 14, at 1098-1107.
284. See id. at 1102.
285. See id. at 1102-04.
286. See id. at 1104.
287. See id. at 1100-01, 1104.
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make political expenditures to further an exempt purpose rather
than to function as mere conduits that channel contributions to
further the interests of donors and the candidates that they favor.
If legislators do not share my willingness to trust truly inde-
pendent charities, as constrained by the general federal income
tax rules discussed above, 28 alternative approaches are available.
One approach is to deny donors a federal income tax deduction for
a portion of their contributions to a charity that makes political
campaign-related expenditures. A similar, partial deduction dis-
allowance rule already applies with respect to membership dues
paid to a tax-exempt organization that makes lobbying or political
campaign-related expenditures; an allocable portion of such dues
is non-deductible by a taxpayer that incurs them in carrying on a
trade or business.2 9 Similarly, one may deny a charitable contri-
butions deduction for a portion of a donation used by the charita-
ble donee to support or oppose political candidates.29 °
A variant of this alternative is to distinguish statutorily among
three types of donations: (1) those that are restricted exclusively
for non-political expenditures; (2) those that are unrestricted; and
(3) those that are designated for political expenditures made in
the discretion of the donee. Contributions in the first category
would be fully deductible under Code section 170, whereas those
in the third category would be entirely non-deductible. Contribu-
tions in the second category would be partially deductible, de-
pending on the extent to which they are allocable to political ex-
penditures.
All of these alternatives address the private interest/conduit is-
sue without silencing the voice of charities wishing to endorse or
oppose a candidate for public office. They demonstrate the false
dilemma that characterizes arguments in favor of current law-
that one must choose between the ban and unabridged election-
eering by charities that will be exploited by politicians and their
supporters. The ban is simply not the only way to protect against
this exploitation of charities.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 269-76.
289. See I.R.C. §§ 162(e)(3), 6033(e)(1) (2000).
290. Of course, any such approach should account for strategic behavior by donors and
charities, for example, bunching donations in one year and expenditures in another.
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Moreover, these alternatives offer some advantages over the
use of section 501(c)(4) affiliates under current law. First, the
ability to endorse a candidate directly and without the loss of tax
exemption can be extremely important to a charitable entity. The
major point of an endorsement is often to lend a good name to a
candidate. To force the stakeholders of a charity to form a section
501(c)(4) entity for political endorsements is to deny the charity
the use of its reputation and credibility in making the endorse-
ment.29 1 The alternatives to the ban avoid this disassociation, and
they do so in a way that is parallel to the manner with which
current law treats political campaign-related expenditures in-
curred in furthering a trade or business.292 Further, requiring the
creation of section 501(c)(4) affiliates produces inefficiencies. Most
obviously, their formation and operation generate additional costs
(e.g., legal fees, filing fees, and probably increased accounting and
auditing fees). These costs may be sufficiently high that a small
charity cannot even afford to create a section 501(c)(4) affiliate.
Moreover, if a leader of a charity desires to communicate her
views about a political candidate to a charity's members, she can
do so under current law; 293 she just may not do so in the normal
course of the charity's operations, such as in a sermon2 94 or in a
speech to members at an annual meeting.295 Forcing her to pur-
sue methods of informing her membership outside the context of
normal operations will often require the expenditure of additional
resources and the sacrifice of more time.
In summary, alternatives to the ban will enable charities to ex-
press their political voices without creating a serious risk that
politicians and their self-seeking constituents will exploit chari-
ties to further their private interests.
291. Cf. Kemmitt, supra note 12, at 173 (stating that a "church's free exercise rights
and its religious/political message are bound up in the identity of the speaker to a unique
degree"). Indeed, at least one religious entity has insisted that the ability to speak as a
church, rather than through an affiliated ministry, is theologically imperative. See GOD
ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, supra note 133, at 379.
292. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1).
293. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text; see also Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-
25 I.R.B. 1421.
294. See TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES, supra note 145, at 8 ex.4.
295. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
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2. The Subsidized Electioneering Issue
The subsidized electioneering issue also does not require ad-
herence to the ban. First, justifying the outright ban is problem-
atic even under one or more subsidy theories. Even if one con-
cludes that the Code conveys a governmental subsidy to charities,
one can determine whether any given charity actually receives a
subsidy in excess of that received by other entities permitted to
intervene in political campaigns only on a case-by-case basis.296
There are especially good reasons to doubt that many churches
receive a substantial subsidy. 297 As applied to numerous charities,
the ban may actually impose a disproportionately high penalty
for expressing their political voice (relative to their non-charitable
counterparts). For those charities, the subsidized electioneering
concern does not justify the ban; if anything, it suggests that the
ban disproportionately amplifies the partisan political voice of
non-charitable entities.
Moreover, if the better view is that charities do not receive a
governmental subsidy by virtue of Code sections 170 and
501(c)(3), any concern is not really one of "subsidized electioneer-
ing." Nevertheless, the fact remains that some charitable donees
receive more money than they would absent the ability to receive
donations that are deductible by donors. If these charities are al-
lowed to support and oppose political candidates, they will have
an advantage over many non-section 501(c)(3) entities. This may
or may not be a significant concern. 29" Assuming that it is a real
concern, it is helpful to demonstrate that the ban is still unneces-
sary.
Consider the two alternatives, briefly discussed in Part III.E. 1,
which deny a deduction for the portion of charitable contributions
used by charitable donees to support or oppose a candidate for
public office. Professor Tobin's main concern is with the ability of
donors to deduct contributions used by charitable donees to par-
296. See supra Part I.C.1.
297. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
298. Existing law, apart from the ban, already prevents a charity from operating pri-
marily for political purposes. See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text. A charity
that devotes extensive assets to promote a political agenda would likely fail to remain ex-
empt even in the absence of the ban. See id. Moreover, the charitable sector is extremely
diverse. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. Even if the charitable sector would
gain an especially prominent political voice in the absence of the ban, it is not clear that
this voice would harm the democratic process.
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ticipate in political campaigns. 299 These methods solve this prob-
lem, and they do so without squelching the political voice of chari-
ties.
Further, insofar as Professor Tobin is willing to tolerate mini-
mal subsidizing of political speech, additional alternatives to the
ban are available. One alternative is to permit charitable organi-
zations to engage in political campaign activity to the same de-
gree that they may lobby under current law-as an insubstantial
part of their activities." 0 Another option is to permit charities to
expend funds for partisan political purposes as long as expendi-
tures fall within some statutory ceiling-an approach similar to
that codified in Code section 170(h) for charities that elect to be
governed by that section. There are other options, as well. My
point is not to discuss these options exhaustively, but simply to
illustrate that Professor Tobin's subsidized electioneering concern
does not require federal income tax law to maintain the ban.
Other options can satisfactorily address this concern, without sti-
fling the political expression of charitable entities.
F. Synopsis
Professor Tobin's arguments in support of the ban as it applies
to charities raise important issues, and his final argument rests
upon valid concerns. His arguments, however, do not reflect the
diversity of the charitable sector and the multitude of competing
approaches employed by charities to better society, nor do they
account for the extant problems of non-objectivity of educational
organizations even with the ban, or recognize how removing the
ban could enhance the influence of truly objective charities. Fur-
ther, his arguments discount how more complete participation in
the political process can further a charity's mission and do not ac-
count for theories of the charity income tax exemption and the
charitable contributions deduction that are not based on the sub-
sidy theory.
To his credit, Professor Tobin does identify the most compelling
reasons to limit political campaign participation by charities-the
private interest/conduit issue and, perhaps, the subsidized elec-
tioneering issue. Alternatives to the ban can address these con-
299. See Tobin, supra note 11, at 1325.
300. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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cerns, however, without unduly stifling charitable organizations'
legitimate political speech.
CONCLUSION
Professor Tobin's justification of the ban on participation in po-
litical campaigns by charities is an important contribution to the
legal literature discussing this provocative topic. The type of
charitable sector that he is attempting to foster-one that is ob-
jective, primarily independent of governmental influence, and
true to a charitable mission-is laudable. Furthermore, his com-
mitment to democratic values is sound. His arguments, however,
do not justify the ban.
This conclusion does not imply that Professor Tobin has ex-
pressed entirely groundless concerns or an absurd thesis. On the
contrary, he has identified at least two issues-the private inter-
est/conduit issue and the subsidized electioneering issue-that
suggest the propriety of some type of governmental restriction on
the political expenditures of charities. The private inter-
est/conduit issue is probably the greater concern. Nonetheless, in
the context of current law and available alternatives, these valid
concerns do not compel adherence to Code section 501(c)(3)'s ban
on electioneering by charities. Alternatives to the ban are avail-
able.
The most compelling reason to favor these alternatives is that
they enable charities to retain a more meaningful voice in public
affairs. Historically, the political voice of charities has contrib-
uted importantly to social change.3" 1 Political campaigns raise is-
sues that demarcate the positions of candidates; therefore, a char-
ity's position on issues will often imply approval or disapproval of
individual candidates. Moreover, many charitable organizations
may rightly believe that the policies which they favor are most
likely to become law if certain candidates are elected. Permitting
charities to communicate their views of political candidates with-
out incurring tax-related penalties affords them the opportunity
to advocate vigorously for these policies. Given this country's
commitment to free expression, federal tax law should err, if at
all, on the side of permitting more speech-not stifling it.
301. See Not Even a Peep?, supra note 14, at 1095-96.
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